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ABSTRACT
A barrier to liberty in the modern world overlooked by liberal
political theorists (e.g. Rawls), I suggest, is over-
compartmentalization--the joint effect of the spatial,
temporal, and qualitative discontinuities resulting from
overspecialization. The problem is best seen in relief
against a more "whole" alternative, in this case, that of the
Amish. Compartmentalization both has crimped the free
movement of persons trying to enact their choices, and, by
engulfing those persons in huge systems whose agendas they
cannot control, has quashed their capability to make choices
at all. Not only liberty, but fairness, is at stake: these
impediments are not only generally objectionable (and
removable as we shall see), but also affect certain groups
much more than others--not only those who wish to fill their
lives with more than the preoccupation of a single specialty
(a large majority, I presume), but also special segments who
either 2) seek an Amish-like way of life or 3) would wish to
avoid succumbing to unfortunate psychological or sociological
susceptibilities of various kinds or 4) lack the adroitness
and resourcefulness it takes to hop from compartment to
compartment or 5) are subordinates in large organizations.
It is not necessary to eliminate technological civilization to
redress these inequities. Nor is it desirable. Multifarious
disjointed activities complement more "simple," unified
practices by adding "breadth," to "depth," of choice and by
supplementing them technologically and educationally where
they are lacking. Conversely, the "whole life"--especially if
the Amish precedent is indicative--benefits dwellers of the
compartments in various palpable ways--culturally,
psychologically, ecologically, sociologically. From all this
it follows not only that barriers to the whole life should be
removed, but also that the whole life should be the target of
governmental support as a "public good." There truly is a
niche for wholeness in a compartmentalized society.
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Is life in the "free" societies of the modern
industrialized West really free? Have the revolutionary
technical, scientific, economic, and juridical changes of the
last two centuries culminated in a "liberation" of humankind
in a material and a political sense? Obviously many people
think so, now not only in the West, but lately in the
revolutionizing Eastern Bloc. Many social and political
thinkers, in particular, have sought to clarify the nature of
this freedom, to justify it theoretically, and to secure and
consolidate the advances that have given rise to it. Perhaps
no more adamant group has been the liberal egalitarians,
those who--in roughest terms--construe freedom not merely as
the absence of external political constraints (giving rise
in turn to unfettered economic initiative and industry as in
19th century Britain), but also as the presence of
opportunities to act on one's freedoms; and moreover, the
presence of a distributional scheme to make such
opportunities accessible in a manner fair to everyone.
Championing fair opportunities are the theorists John Rawls,
Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, to mention three contemporaries.
But there is reason to question whether even these
thinkers have gone far enough. What they and practically
everyone else take for granted are the material and economic
foundations of our novel modern liberties: the system of
competitive technical and economic specializations that can
be credited, among other things, with increasing material
wealth and expanding available job categories. This advanced
technological organization we all serve and submit to in our
multifarious occupations, which interlock like components in
a vast mechanism. Doesn't anyone wonder whether this system
may in some way inhibit our freedom even as it seems to expand
it?
of course--as members of the convulsing Eastern Bloc may
well be aware--Karl Marx was one long ago who aired strong
reservations about modern technological systems, pointing to
the virtual enslavement of the exploited factory laborer.
And there have been other memorable voices of criticism--
Durkheim, who questioned the tendency of the division of
labor to dissolve the "collective conscience," hence the
principal basis of social "solidarity" and individual
psychological stability, and ultimately liberty itself;
"romantics" like Ruskin and Morris who decried the
obsolescence of skilled workmanship; and more recently a
social critic like Jacques Ellul, who alleges we have made
our means into our ends and thereby obtain ever-increasing
technical virtuosity and material luxuriance at the cost of
ever-decreasing spiritual vitality--in a word, freedom.
Do the liberal egalitarians seem to be concerned with
the admonitions of these critics? Not overmuch. One
response they have easy recourse to (assuming Marx's critique
is outdated) is to point out an advantage found in Ellul's
argument itself: yes, modern technology merely provides us the
means. That is the beauty of it. It is left to us to fill
in the rest--whether communal solidarity, workmanship, or
moral fortitude or something else found wanting by
technological critics. That is what it means to be free. To
be too specific about the outlines of a just society is to
decide for others what they ought to decide for themselves.
The technological mechanism comes benignly short of this
smugness. It provides merely the opportunity to do what we
want.
But--and here is the critical question for the liberal
egalitarian--do the previously mentioned sorts of critiques
exhaust the unpleasant possibilities? Are the primary
barriers to freedom posed by technological society really only
moral and sociological "blank spots" that readily may be
filled in by personal choice? Or are there other perhaps
more concrete or structural barriers that impede choice, and
flout the intentions of the individual? Could our "means"
actually be getting in our way? Technological advancement
seems to be correlated with many signs of sociological
sickness, which affect the "well-off" almost as much as the
materially "disadvantaged": high rates of depression,
divorce, teenage maladjustment (delinquency, unwanted
pregnancy, drugs, apathy), crime, homelessness. Does it seem
plausible that these blights are entirely chosen?
In what follows, I hope to establish the existence of a
fundamental stratum of concrete barriers to choice endemic to
technological society which have been given insufficient-to-no
attention by previous critics of modern life, not to mention
liberal egalitarian thinkers. These barriers are not mere
moral lacunae, but real (in principle quantifiable) spatial
and temporal discontinuities in our living environments. They
are caused by the specialization of functions necessary for
efficiency and affluence in a highly technological and
rationalized society; and they are barriers to freedom not
only in themselves but also because of the way they
necessarily alter the quality of our living experience and,
moreover, sharply delimit realms of direct personal control
within cubicles (the administrative problem, to be discussed
in a later section). In a word, technological society
compartmentalizes human life.
I also hope to point out that the existence of these
barriers, however grave, hardly requires the wholesale
dismantling of the technological system. It is possible to
critique, and not eliminate, advanced technology. Certainly
technological society is here to stay (barring a catastrophe).
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Moreover, modern advances offer undeniable benefits, whatever
their drawbacks. What is called for, however, is the
promotion, for those who would elect it, of an alternate, more
unified way of life exemplified, say, by the Amish, whom I
have studied. This more "whole" alternative would coexist
with and complement the barriers of technological
fragmentation: call it the "whole life." While inefficient
in industrial terms, it is highly efficient in its own--namely
in providing means, where technological society lacks them,
for the individual to choose at once social solidarity, manual
and mental skills, and certain moral associations, or other
values wanting in technological and highly "rationalized"
environments (actually, that last-named commonly used term may
be a misnomer, for the result is not all that rational).
Moreover, whereas the sort of "whole life" I advocate might
have been materially quite insecure or limiting two hundred
years ago, today--thanks to a coexistent technology--it is in
no danger of falling to the ills often blamed on
"backwardness": hunger, plague, famine, objectionably onerous
labors, geographic isolation, parochialism, and above all,
absence of vocational choice. All these technological society
makes obsolete. This means that technological society and the
"whole life" need not be adversaries, but complementary halves
of a greater social whole.
Amish success in the midst of contemporary American
society attests to the promise of this mutualism. It also
attests to the fact that this mutualism goes both ways. For
those who would choose to remain ensconced in technological
society--presumably a majority--the existence of
"non-technologized" pockets offers tremendous benefits. The
Amish even now can be considered a "public good" offering
generalized advantages even to lovers of technology: benefits
such as soil and resource conservation, historic preservation,
relief of social agency rolls, insurance in case of a
catastrophe, and so forth. If there were more people living
like the Amish--even if not you or I--we all would be better
off.
The question remains: how can we justly promote such a
modified scheme? But more pressing for now, what in greater
detail are the obstacles which technological society poses to
freedom and justice? And in what way do these obstacles
expose the shortcomings of modern liberal egalitarian thought?
Since Rawls's theory has received perhaps greatest attention,
since it is worked out so thoroughly, and since it is perhaps
the most scrupulous of any in preserving equal rights and
opportunities for individuals and correcting for the caprices
of the market and of chance, it seems natural to focus on it.
(Mention of other political philosophers such as Sen and
Dworkin will come in as need be).
This essay will have six parts: first, an overview of
the unnoticed barriers to freedom erected by technological
society (17 pages); second, a demonstration of the inadequacy
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of Rawlsian political philosophy at dealing with such barriers
(23 pages); third, as a foil illuminating technological
society and allowing an appreciation of the more "whole"
alternative and its feasibility, an extended exposition of
Amish life (39 pages--this part will have two main sections:
one dwelling on the spatial, temporal, and qualitative unity
or "efficiency" of the "whole life" [10 pages]; the other, on
the greater room this advantage gives autonomy--that is,
greater direct personal control over the factors shaping one's
destiny [29 pages]; all bearing in mind some of the challenges
and defects of Amish life); fourth, in order to give
technological society its "fair" shake, an exposition of its
benefits complementing the "whole life" (four pages); fifth,
to round out the presentation, the benefits of the "whole
life" complementing technological society, showing that the
two can reinforce, and not antagonize, each other (five
pages); finally, to remove fears that the "whole life" is
practically unattainable in this age, some specific proposals
on policy (twelve pages).
The movement of the writing, then, goes like this:
first, to show the problem of fragmented living and the
liberal failure to come to terms with it; then, to show the
Amish antithesis of the problem and some of its own problems;
next, how both kinds of living, in creative combination, with
their problems, offer each other what each lacks; and finally,
how we can bring about a not-unfeasible resolution.
Section I
The Barriers of Compartment allization.
Compartmentalization is taken for granted as a "natural"
result of advanced technological life in modern times. Every
society has some degree of compartmentalization, after all,
and even ours has extended itself by a gradual development.
It would almost seem as innocuous and familiar as the trees in
our front yard. No one seems to be looking, however, at the
forest. Taken in their entirety, the many extra compartments
of our technological landscape add up to a large barrier.
Like woods or a hedge, their simple physical presence gets in
our way. They are just as real and cumbrous as any brick
wall--and many of them in fact are contained within brick
walls. Our modern attitude, for all its seeming
"materialism," is surprisingly "spiritualistic" on this
matter: it all but denies the physical reality of these
obvious obstacles. Perhaps as beneficiaries of so much
technology, we have been trained to hold in contempt the
impediments of space and time, and treat them as if they
didn't exist.
Nevertheless, they exist, and even ironically are
created in part by the very technology that is supposed to be
eliminating them. They operate along the following
dimensions:
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1. Spatial. When life is divided across space, it is
less handy. Like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that have
been scattered across the room, the parts of our lives are
more trouble to assemble--require more running around--than
if they remained in one place. In contemporary America, when
all the costs are factored in, the average citizen (who
cannot wink himself from here to there) spends one quarter of
a working year in real travel time. This period takes into
account time that must be spent working simply to pay for
transportation costs. In effect, eight hours a day during
the months of January, February, and March are devoted to
getting from point "A" to point "B." This brings us to a
related barrier.
2. Temporal. When activities or aspects of life are
divided across space, they must also be divided across time.
They cannot be engaged in simultaneously. This means that
life in an overly compartmentalized society is less dense.
The Amish farmer is able to exercise his body, enjoy natural
beauty, practice manual skills, teach skills to his children,
socialize, manage a complex enterprise, and earn a living all
at once. For the average American to do the same things
would take a tremendous amount more time. Observe that, in
spite of the wonderful "time-saving" devices modern
technology has bequeathed on us, we complain that life is
"hectic" and we never seem to have enough time to do what we
want. This complaint reveals that most of our time is not
really "rich" time that we can savor, but "threadbare" time--
relatively unfilled time--that we must "get over with" to
move onto the next thing.
3. Qualitative. An integrated whole is different in
quality from the mere sum of its parts. A fragmented life
somehow often can be less smooth, "rich," or meaningful--
therefore less digestible an experience. It is far easier and
more pleasant to eat a cake than lumps of flour, sugar, salt,
egg, and milk consumed consecutively. But when
compartmentalization goes to an extreme, we seem to find
ourselves frequently doing the latter rather than the former.
Viewed on these lines, spatial, temporal, and
qualitative, compartmentalization I think constitutes a
formidable general barrier to human freedom. Taking still
another dimension, which I will call administrative,
compartmentalization can be seen directly to reduce individual
autonomy and responsibility by shrinking spheres of personal
influence to minuscule proportions. But I will save a
discussion of this problem for Section III, part 2, where it
will receive special and expanded attention.
Who feels the pinch most? For many, to be sure,
fragmentation at the same time may provide great advantages.
Besides overall material wealth, achieved through greater
efficiency, it increases opportunities to excel in innumerable
highly specialized skills. The concert pianist may with no
regrets spend half his waking hours in a practice
room--literally a small cubicle. On the other hand, for many
others, this splintering of living activities ironically may
reduce opportunities in many vital respects. At least four or
five groups are significantly affected. These groups overlap,
yet remain analytically distinct:
1. Those who consciously wish to lead a whole life,
that is, an integrated, well-rounded, perhaps strikingly
"unambitious" life like that of the Amish farmer that I will
describe below. (This may be a small group).
2. Anyone not explicitly seeking such radical holism but
still attempting to find fulfillment in more than a single
dimension of personal development--say in areas like mental
and manual skill, or social solidarity hinted at above. (This
may be the vast majority of people).
3. Those who, for whatever reasons, may be prone to the
psychological and social ills which seems to be caused or
exacerbated by industrial fragmentation. These ills, again,
include high rates of depression, divorce, teenage
maladjustment, crime, and homelessness. (This is probably a
sizable minority, or even majority, encompassing both rich and
poor alike, and it suffers very intensely).
4. Those who, whatever goals they seek, are relatively
less adroit at navigating among the spatially and temporally
disjoint compartments (home, work, school, store, gym,
church, nature preserve) of industrial society. (This is an
indeterminate group but is singularly disadvantaged).
5. Subordinates in large organizations (almost
everyone--this problem will be covered, again, in Section III,
part 2).
How specialization leads to compartmentalization.
Compartmentalization is the chief problem I am concerned
with, and it occurs when activities or aspects of life that
could be combined and integrated so as to yield, in one time
and place, a single experiential whole are instead separated
in any of these respects.
Specialization occurs when someone or some group
develops facility in a certain activity to the exclusion of
other activities. Specialization is often called "the
division of labor" and is commonly used as a way of raising
economic productivity or the efficiency or excellence (in a
narrow sense) of any human pursuit or dimension of life.
Compartmentalization and specialization are thus not
interchangeable terms. The former refers to spatial,
temporal, and experiential discontinuities, the latter to
human purposes, plans, and projects as these narrow. Yet the
two are closely connected. The former tends to be the
consequence or the experiential implication of the latter.
Now it is possible that a specialist might still combine
his exacting pursuit with other valuable activities, yielding
out of all of them a single greater experiential whole. A
highly skilled shoemaker who is incompetent at all other jobs
nonetheless might be able to cut leather soles while working
as a team with his wife, children, and next-door neighbors as
they are seated on the front lawn discussing philosophy and
enjoying the beauty of the surrounding woods and chirping
birds--all, perhaps, as an expression of deeply felt
religious beliefs. Yes, specialization without undue
compartmentalization is possible. In fact, a certain degree
of specialization--and even compartmentalization--is
necessary and beneficial to life.
The catch is, however, that in order to specialize (by
definition) one must exclude aspects of life which may
detract from or be incompatible with the selected specialty.
In proportion as one strives to specialize, past a certain
balancing point the chances increase that these aspects will
be driven out. Although it is still quite possible that
some will remain perfectly complementary with the specialty--
for example, breathing with automobile assembly-line work--
nevertheless there is no obvious way in principle to
ascertain in advance which may be at risk. Therefore all are
(even breathing is endangered in some sweatshops). One must
look, it seems, case by case. For example, while the
automobile assembly-line worker may still breathe, he may not
include his eight-, six-, and four-year old daughter and sons
in his work without reducing the efficiency which the
specialized work environment was originally set up to
promote. The result--because children now stay at home
instead--is de facto compartmentalization: fatherhood is
split from work.
Thus (past a certain mean point) specialization tends to,
but need not always in a particular case or respect,
result in compartmentalization. When these modifications
reach detrimental levels, they can be labelled over-
compartmentalization and over-specialization.
Is life in a compartmentalized milieu mandatory?
Compartmentalization follows from specialization. But what
does specialization follow from, and is it mandatory in
an (unremedied) industrial society, hence, for example, in a
theory such as Rawls's that accommodates such industrialism?
Do we have to be specialists, hence "compartmentalists?" Must
we be encumbered by these barriers? Hence, are whole-life
seekers or other victims of such strictures truly being
"discriminated against?"
The obvious success of Amish practices suggests not.
But the Amish enjoy special political privileges and cultural
assets that the rest of us now lack and would still lack
without significant changes (these assets will be described
below). For an individual or even a group to set off and
attempt to live like the Amish without these advantages would
be a tall order indeed, if not an unattainable one. I will
attempt to describe the most obvious economic obstacle
confronting a hypothetical non-Amish whole-life seeker--
namely, competition from specialists--in a later section (when
discussing Rawls's theory and the imperatives of competition
in an increasingly specialized marketplace--pp.38-40 below).
Then, the answer appears that without special assistance, the
Amish-emulator is doomed.
As we shall see still further on, however, it is not
necessary to answer this question once and for all; only to
raise it hypothetically. For in any event (as we shall see),
counting the "whole life" as a bona fide public good will
obviate the need for such an absolute determination, which in
principle and in fact may be impossible to arrive at. A
"public good" provides grounds for public assistance
independent from those of "discrimination."
Nonetheless, in the last analysis, even if it is
possible for non-Amish people to escape the clutches of the
present barriers to the "whole life," it seems clear they
could do so only with extraordinary effort. It is significant
if this is indeed the case.
Secondary effects of compartmentalization. As if
compartmentalization, taken as a general barrier to
opportunity, were not bad enough in itself, it brings on
secondary effects, as hinted, that intensify the hardships for
certain susceptible (possibly overlapping) constituencies, or
at least does so apparently. I want to suggest that it has
contributed--(again, without anyone's choosing this
contribution)--to, among other things, the severest
psychological and social ills of the day. (These
contributions will be described below). Let me underscore,
however, that it is not the burden of this paper to prove a
causal connection between the barriers of compartmentalization
and modern social maladies, only to suggest the connection.
It appears to be a strong possibility from consideration of
the obvious facts and observations of relevant experts.
Still, even this possibility is enough for my purposes. For
either we can assume the truth of it pending empirical
verification, and build the remaining argument contingently.
Or, more likely, since such verification may never come or may
not be considered incontrovertible if it does, then we still
assume the truth of it, only now on the grounds that, given
our very uncertainty, the only safe course is to assume such
a connection. When human lives are dangling in the balance,
better safe than sorry. Error on the negative side carries no
risks (as we shall later see for policy purposes) but error in
the optimistic direction is a catastrophe.
Depression: Us vs. the Amish. There have been many
studies performed attempting to measure the levels of
psychological well-being in American society, but one in
particular may be illuminating given the purpose of this
paper. Studying and interviewing them closely over a period
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of ten years, psychiatrist Janice Egeland found that the
12,000 Amish people living in and around Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania, suffered unipolar depression (sometimes called
"common cold" depression) at a rate that turns out to be five
to ten times lower than that of a comparable group in
Baltimore, Maryland.1 Such depression, which appears
induced to a significant degree by environmental factors, is
to be distinguished from the more severe, biologically
triggered "bipolar," which the Amish suffered at a rate equal
to Baltimore residents. Thus, if we can take the level of
"common cold" depression as a measure, the Amish appear
psychologically more healthy than the rest of us. What makes
the Amish worthy of special scrutiny is the marked difference
of the basic socioeconomic structure of their subculture from
that of the larger society around them. Moreover, three
summers' experience working on two separate Amish farms (one
near Lancaster) has given me detailed first-hand knowledge of
this structure--which is "whole" rather than compartmental-
ized. Thus, at hand is a good opportunity for comparison and
1J. A. Egeland and A. M. Hostetter, "Amish Study I: Affective
disorders among the Amish, 1976-80," American Journal of
Psychiatry, (1983, v.140), pp.56-61. Note also: Martin Seligman
has made the comparison to Baltimore in his "Why is there so much
depression today? The waxing of the individual and the waning of
the commons," The G. Stanley Hall Lecture Series (Washington D. C.
1988).
potential correlation.2
Why, in more detail, would we be more depressed than the
Amish? Of course, this malady probably has multiple causes,
no same combination of which may apply in a single case.
Nevertheless, a couple of the prime causes suggested by Martin
Seligman, who has drawn attention to the Amish attainment,
seem to resonate with the problem of the compartmentalized
barriers I have been describing. "Common cold" depression, he
says, is caused in part by a condition of "learned
helplessness," a state in which "the individual finds himself
helpless to achieve his goals or to escape his frustrations." 3
If I have made one point so far, it is that compartmentaliz-
2Some convergent findings strongly reinforce the connection
between socio-economics and depression levels. For as Seligman
points out (ibid.) modern depression rates are much higher
evidently than not only those of the Amish but also those of
Americans who lived earlier in this century, when socioeconomic
structures everywhere were more Amish-like.
30p. cit., p.23. Yet Seligman seems to follow another track
when providing his overall explanation of Amish success. He argues
that their Protestant asceticism and highly defined social roles
have created a "minimal self" that turns its attentions away from
maximizing its own satisfactions and toward meeting the needs of
others and obeying duty and custom--hence his decrying of the
"waning of the commons" in modern life. I would second this
account (and my support comes below in my account of how the Amish
reconcile their individual choices through religion--see p.68ff).
Yet I would point out it can only go so far. An army or a
totalitarian state is also highly indoctrinated and regimented, and
often its members selflessly oriented. Amish social codes, from my
direct personal observations, while wonderfully salutary in certain
respects, in certain others may go too far and actually constitute
a cause of mental anguish and/or paranoia for certain Amish people.
Thus, to an extent it may be that the Amish are healthy in spite of
these factors, not because of them. This would then point strongly
to a supplementary explanation to Seligman's--one, I would add,
that reveals the freedoms rather than the confinements of the
Amish.
ation makes it more difficult for (to quote Seligman) "the
individual. . . to achieve his goals." A modern citizen must
fumble and bumble, dart and wend, among a staggeringly
disunited array of spheres of human activity to piece together
a life--or just to get through a day. Could these obstacles
do anything but add to the modern person's sense of
"helplessness?"
Interestingly (if I may anticipate a bit) it may be
useful to quote Rawls on the same point: "We can think of a
person as being happy when he is in the way of a successful
execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up
under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is
reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through."4
A vital assumption here is "(more or less) favorable
conditions." If compartmentalization weakens this assumption,
which it must for it imposes the barriers described above,
then this makes for a clear case for the increase of
unhappiness (of which a risen depression rate is assumed to be
one indicator). Rawls, then, might not find it hard to agree
with Seligman.
Now, if we go one step further and insert certain key
goals ("values" or "functionings") into the sought plans, we
see even more reason for the thwarting of life plans--hence
for depression. At one level, it might not really matter
4A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Belknap Press, 1971), p.409.
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which goals to insert, because we are testing for differences
in the level of integration. Taken as mere "markers," one
will serve as well as another in tracing its accessibility
given the socio-economic structure. Yet at another level, the
particular goods used do make a difference. There are certain
goods that appear, at least at a distance, to be what most
people seek in life and would say "mean the most to them."
Seligman, for one, says that attachment to family and
community is a key safeguard against depression.5 Now
subject to the same compartmentalizing tendencies that isolate
other values, these, too, would be relatively harder to
realize.
As for the other goals of possible secondary importance,
it is suggestive that psychiatric hospitals make it a practice
to incorporate arts and handicrafts, as well as physical
exercise in their patients' rehabilitation programs. (The
Menninger Foundation employs these methods). All these kinds
of humanizing pastimes, too, (if available at all) are
contained in the separate cubicles we must try to integrate in
leading our modern lives.
Again, it is interesting to compare Rawls.
Appropriately, his list of what he calls "human goods" or
"familiar values" contains the following: "personal
affection and friendship, meaningful work and social
cooperation, the pursuit of knowledge and the fashioning and
50p. cit., p.2, p.23.
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contemplation of beautiful objects."6 These echo or at least
significantly overlap the kinds of values mentioned above, not
to mention the notions of social solidarity, mental and manual
skills, and perhaps moral vitality alluded to in the
introduction. For the sake of uniformity and since several
items seem to be either redundant or derivative of simpler
elements anyway, I would reduce Rawls's list to the following:
"personal affection, and aesthetic and intellectual
engagement" (the latter two would encompass everything from
work to poetic and philosophical contemplation). I would also
include one additional item, for reasons that will become
obvious if they are not already: physical invigoration.
Since he says these values occupy "an important if not
central place in our life,"7 it seems reasonable to assume
that Rawls, again, would not find it hard to agree, at an
implicit level, with psychiatric personnel on some of the most
searing sources of human unhappiness. The failure to realize
these, as opposed to other values, could well intensify the
frustration--or perhaps the depression--that might be suffered
by someone having difficulty juggling the pieces of his life.
Moreover, it is convenient to isolate these values
because they are common and thus easy to trace: they prevail
also among the Amish. Considering their importance in life,
6A Theory of Justice, op. cit., p.425.
7Ibid., p.425.
this is no coincidence. It will be most helpful to refer to
this list whether discussing depression or not. When turning
to the Amish later in this essay, thus keep in mind how the
absence of compartmentalization would alleviate two possible
sources of discontent, or more gravely, depression: first,
removing barriers to an individual's achieving any goals;
second, removing barriers to the achievement of generally
valued and psychologically salutary goals.8
All this, at any rate, is to suggest that, in some
respect or other, over-compartmentalization quite conceivably
lists among important factors contributing to the modern
plague of depression.
Other Social Ills. Before proceeding to an examination
of the Rawlsian response, however, consider some other
possible effects of fragmented life. For one,
compartmentalization seems least of all suited to children.
(I would suggest that the pronounced and rising signs of
psychological maladjustment they exhibit--the delinquency,
8By now the difference between my emphasis and a Marxian one
should be clearer: fragmentation in life as a whole, not merely at
the work place. Yet Marx may have had the former in the back of
his mind all along. Once the shackles of capitalism are thrown off
under communism, then one might freely "hunt in the morning, fish
in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening [and] criticize after
dinner" to avoid "a particular, exclusive sphere of activity." The
communist sounds startlingly similar to an Amish farmer. See
Marx's German Ideology in The Marx-Engels Reader, Tucker ed., New
York: Norton, 1978, p.160.
drugs, pregnancy, and sheer apathy--are no accident9). Since
they are not yet of sufficient age to execute a life-plan of
their own, they are determined largely by that of the parents.
But in their parents' lives they are put in only one
compartment--home life. From their parents' point of view,
they constitute another separate effort that must be exerted
out of joint with all the other disjointed efforts. The
result is less parental attention. Children increasingly are
turned over to specialists and specialized institutions, for
whom and for which, by definition, the children represent
"students" or "clients"--not so much whole persons with a
gamut of psychological needs which require the most careful
attention in delicate formative years. Can teachers, day-care
supervisors, or peers really fulfill the functions of parents
(or other older close relatives) in such areas as love and
character-building?
The peer group has become a default substitute for the
family in the world of modern youth, but a substitute of
dubious value indeed. In the more extreme form, the youth
gang becomes a micro-substitute for the whole society, with
its own code of laws, social hierarchy, territorial
9For a thorough but readable account, see Urie Bronfenbrenner,
"The Origins of Alienation," Scientific American, (January 1974),
pp.52-61. Is this account dated? Actually, the article is
valuable in this very respect because, since it was written, the
very tendencies it outlines have starkly worsened. See also "The
Split Society: Children vs. Adults," in The End of Innocence, ed.
Charles M. Haar, 1974.
boundaries, and "national defense system." This should be no
surprise since not only the family, but the social whole in
which it is imbedded, has been broken down.
And to talk about children is really to talk about
adults--for who are they but grown up children? The level of
psychological or social adjustment of adults to an important
extent can be only the reflection of the psychological or
sociological conditions they experienced as children.
Depressed or maladjusted children can make for depressed or
maladjusted grown-ups. It would be impossible really to
measure how many of the grave social ills of a society--say,
as in ours, the high rates of crime, homelessness, poverty,
and drug or alcohol addiction alluded to several times
above--have their origins in poor family and neighborhood
life. And yet those origins appear to be undeniable. If we
fail often to recognize this simple connection, that may
merely reflect itself a social fact: the rigid age-
compartmentalization found in modern society. In particular,
the question needs to be asked: will a child relegated to a
single parcel, out of many, in the lives of the adults who
oversee him or her, grow up adept at juggling the many
compartments it takes to succeed in adulthood? In youth may
well be sown the seed of its own frustration. Child
psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner indeed argues that to avoid
alienation, children need to be involved all along in the
whole of the adults' world in the course of becoming adults
themselves. We become human, he says, only by the fullest
possible contact with other, primarily older, humans. Modern
"split" social arrangements drastically dilute the richness of
such contacts.10
Compounding the difficulties for youth is the modern
tragedy of divorce. As if not bad enough for the parents, it
has been said that a growing child experiences divorce as a
death, made perhaps worse by the blame a child instinctively
places on himself for the misfortune. While "underdeveloped"
societies suffer high rates of infant mortality, in this sense
"developed" countries are blighted by "parental mortality."
But divorce itself would seem, again, an unchosen consequence
in part of compartmentalization. The divorce of man and wife
in the modern world, it could be argued (and will appear
plainer by contrast when examining the Amish) began with the
divorce of the father's work interests from those of the
mother and household, and the new reliance of the marital bond
solely on the capability to sustain a romantic feeling over
time through every hardship and change of life, rather than on
more complex holistic ties and supports. Put another way,
modern marital interactions have been assigned a box--the one
called "home life." This leaves them relatively unreinforced.
Now, how well can liberal egalitarian theory accommodate
all these infelicities (basic structural and secondary)?
10Ibid., esp. "The Split Society. . ."
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Section II
Rawls and the unfairnesses of compartmentalization. In
his Theory of Justice and subsequent articles, philosopher
John Rawls elaborates the theoretical physiology of a fair
society. 1 Each person is to have a fair chance to pursue his
or her own vision of the good life and in a way that he or she
sees fit. No single comprehensive moral doctrine may serve as
a basis for justice; instead the basic social structure is
arranged so as to provide the means whereby individuals can
enact their own distinctive goals and ideals. These means
Rawls calls "primary goods," and they include "rights and
liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth."
"These goods," Rawls says, "normally have a use whatever a
person's rational plan of life. "12 Moreover, their
distribution must fulfill Rawls's stipulation of fairness:
"justice as fairness requires that all primary social goods be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution would be to
everyone's advantage."1 3  (He revises this statement further





revised statement is known as the "difference principle."1 4 )
That last qualification may seem a bit curious. How
could "an unequal distribution. . . be to everyone's
advantage"? One way Rawls himself mentions--which arguably
prevails in a modern technological society to which his theory
applies--is by providing monetary incentives to entrepreneurs
and inventors, say, to build factories and produce
commodities which raise the overall level of wealth and
opportunity, thus (seemingly) improving everyone's lot in
these respects. Rawls's allowance thus makes room for the
bonanzas that can flow from personal industry and initiative
when these are well rewarded.
But if Rawls sanctions these possible benefits of
technological society, he fails, as mentioned, correspond-
ingly to institute adequate safeguards against at least one
important detriment. The same industrial system that creates
wealth and jobs, again, fragments human life. Here I do not
refer merely to the over-specialization in the work place--
part of a predicament (that Marx focused on) of the factory
worker whose tasks were broken down into meaningless bits.
Rawls has explicitly (if fleetingly) addressed this part of
the Marxian objection.15 What Rawls, however, omits to point
out and what I view as a worse contemporary threat, again, is
14Ibid., p.83 and p.302.
15 Ibid., p.529.
32
that larger fragmentation of which the fragmented job is only
a piece (yet this larger fragmentation is still driven to an
extent by industry and economics, I suspect. See pp.38-40
below). In fact, it would be possible in this scenario for
someone to enjoy utter fulfillment at work, yet still suffer
from an overall "environmental schizophrenia." Modern life is
divided artificially into compartments which we all know as
"home," "work," "school," "gymnasium," and "church," among
others. The separations are spatial, temporal, and
qualitative, and they all contribute to the difficulty for any
person of integrating the contents of the sundry cubicles.
Among the downtrodden in particular are certain (overlapping)
groups named above that have special reason to prize
wholeness.
A Rawlsian counterargument of "limited social space" and
a response. It might be countered that, despite appearances,
the debilitating factors in Rawls's social structure would
affect everyone more or less equally, or in a manner that
could be deemed fair under the circumstances. Rawls has after
all advocated "fair shares" of primary goods for every
citizen, thus furthering the fairness of life-prospects--
opportunities to advance individuals' own conceptions of the
good. And as I have hinted, the widening of these
opportunities depends to an extent on the same forces that
fragment life. The fragmentation could thus be viewed as an
unavoidable side-effect of fair procedure.
Furthermore, Rawls's plan respects the "general fact" of
pluralism in modern society, which precludes the establishment
of any single comprehensive moral doctrine as a guiding ideal.
Perhaps if this "fact" were otherwise, a system more favorable
to integration and psychological and social health might be
desirable. A concession Rawls makes tempts us with the
possibility: "We may indeed lament the limited space, as it
were, of social worlds, and of ours in particular, and we may
regret some of the inevitable effects of our culture and
social structure. As Sir Isaiah Berlin has long maintained
(it is one of his fundamental themes), there is no social
world without loss."16  Thus, what we end up with may be far
from the best of all possible worlds, but at least, given the
facts, it is the lesser of evils. And if some impediments to
certain modes of living are built into the Rawlsian system, we
all face the same impediments.
So might run a plausible counterargument. Maybe if only
the opportunity to enjoy what I call a "whole life" were at
stake, the reply would be satisfactory. Maybe, maybe not.
One wonders if all "facts" of modern society are equally
immutable. And indeed later in this paper I will attempt to
show that seemingly unavoidable economic pressures can be
counterbalanced--that even now certain policy makers (namely
16
"Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good," Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 17:4, p.265.
in the agricultural sphere) recognize the value of a "whole
life" and have for years been creating special economic oases
for it. Their policies have not worked because the
recognition is only partial, and so the measures self-
contradictory and self-defeating. A clearer vision would
mean more effective policy. And more avenues to wholeness.
At the same time, when clinical depression or other acute
social ills enters the picture, the implications are most
stark and cannot go unaddressed, for reasons that will be
described below. Thus, whether wholeness is sought, or
sickness risked, justice is in jeopardy.
Modern compartmentalization and Rawls, revisited. Before
looking in more detail again at these groups stymied by the
walls of compartmentalization, it is necessary to determine to
what extent a thinker like Rawls assumes and incorporates it
in his theory. The Theory of Justice depends of course on at
least some division of labor in society. For without it we
would all be farmers (or given a low population-density,
possibly hunter-gatherers), and there would be no meaning to
the freedom to choose a life-plan. The question, then, is how
much specialization and whether it is optional or unavoidable.
(I will assume that specialization leads to
compartmentalization in the way described above, pp.17-19).
I suspect Rawls did not consider this much of an issue.
Such answer as he provides is conveyed in the sections titled
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"The Aristotelian Principle" and "The Idea of a Social
Union"17 but largely implicitly or perhaps inadvertently. He
seems both to approve and encourage existing modern
specialization to a significant extent (enough to raise a
three-fold inconvenience--cf. pp.14-15 above) and to
discourage or even rule out low-specialization alternatives.
Yet these results come more by default than intent, I
believe.18 Rawls does not so much mandate
over-compartmentalization as fail to institute sufficient
safeguards against it, or even to identify it as a problem.
This incaution is partly evident in his presentation of
the Aristotelian Principle:
. . . other things equal, human beings enjoy the
exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or
trained abilities) and this enjoyment increases the more
the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity.
The intuitive idea here is that human beings take more
pleasure in doing something as they become more
proficient at it, and of two activities they do equally
well, they prefer the one calling on a larger epertoire
of more intricate and subtle discriminations.
Rawls counts the Aristotelian Principle among the "general
facts" of life and society.20 It is not a human good
or rather, a concept of the good life, in itself, but "part
of the background that regulates . . . judgements" of the
170p. cit., pp.424-33, pp.520-29.





good,21 a structural feature of normal human
psychological and biological development. 22 At first glance,
these claims seem common-sensical affirmations of a healthy
and beneficial human tendency (and I myself have indicated
the necessity of a certain amount of specialization, p.18).
Yet if Rawls had been attentive to the dangers
associated with fragmentation or the desires of some to be
well-rounded, he perhaps would have shaded the description
differently. As things stand, rather than acquiring a knack
or general "know-how" for various skills and perhaps merely
maintain them in an integrated balance like the Amish farmer
or his wife, the person living in keeping with the principle
would de-emphasize the several pursuits and focus on one or
few. Only in this way, after all, can that person attain the
virtuosity which Rawls describes.
For the cut-off point for further aspiration is when we
begin to exceed "innate capacities" and must overcome
"increasing strains of learning as the activity becomes more
strenuous and difficult." "Natural talents," he says, "have
an upward bound."23 But clearly the limit imposed upon
someone like the Amish farmer is not innate capacity. He
could readily plunge himself into perfecting any or all of




"hardships" to his person. 2 4 Rather, the limit is
imposed by the activities themselves--something external to
him--which, if they are to survive as a self-reinforcing
group, must be maintained in a balance or more-or-less
unchanging golden proportion. If anything, the farmer's
difficulties would lie in keeping himself from accentuating
his various skills--in overcoming the temptation to
specialize. This farmer would savor the challenge of all-
around mediocrity--of staying the way he is. (Interestingly,
one of the most common infringements of Amish community
regulations which they call their Ordnung occurs because of
the specializing temptation).
Rawls makes the Aristotelian Principle optional,
however, so in fact it is not essential enough to the Theory
to exclude the more all-around approaches I have described.
Economics. Yet at one point, Rawls connects it closely
to other "plain facts," and these "facts" are basic to his
theory (and as we shall see, thus render his stipulation of
it ,25
"other things equal,' inherently hard to meet).
Accordingly, they much more directly determine the course of
life and conceptions of the good. The "facts" appear
principally to be economic ones:
24Ibid., p.428.
25Ibid. p.426.
Not only is there a tendency in this direction
[toward increasing complexity] postulated by the
Aristotelian Principle, but the plain facts of
social interdependency and the nature of our
interests morn narrowly construed incline us in
the same way.
Presumably when Rawls speaks of "our interests more narrowly
construed," he is talking, at least in part, of interests as
they fit into the economic system--a large portion of the
realm of more settled and inescapable "general facts" on
which Rawls builds his theory. According to him, for
efficiency's sake (and he employs Pareto efficiency) the best
economic arrangement, whether property is privately owned or
not, is the competitive free market. True, efficiency is
supposed to be subordinate to Rawls's two principles of
justice, but unless the conflict I am trying to identify is
brought to the surface, they will be unintentionally
violated. In the absence of recognition of a disharmony with
fairness, what the (unrevised) Aristotelian Principle does
not force on us, economics may. Pressures of competition and
mechanical specialization--driven in part by personal
industry and economic incentives that Rawls admits and would,
it seems, unequally reward (see above p.32), have hastened
already in the United States the demise of many non-
specialized practices, and notable in the area of farming.
The so-called "agri-businessman" now does with virtuosic
intensity in his own area of specialization what a husbandman
26Ibid., pp.428-9.
does merely satisfactorily amongst his several more amateurish
tasks. The result is often logical matter of course: he is
outflanked by "conquerors" and must follow suit and
specialize, or perish. Thus, economic "facts" supersede
Rawls's more elevating commendations of the Aristotelian
Principle. Although implicitly Rawls's principles of fairness
may rule out this misfortune (because, say, unequal financial
rewards ought to make everyone better off), we ought
explicitly be made aware of the dangers to avoid inadvertent
or unrecognized injustices--especially in the trade-off
between productivity and pursuit of the "whole life."
Ronald Dworkin, in an alternate theory of liberal
egalitarianism, presents an interestingly expanded role for
the free market, which, however, places in perhaps greater
jeopardy opportunities for the unambitious whole-life seeker.
For Dworkin, the market is not only the economic context of
fair distribution--it is the mechanism of fair distribution,
at least if subject to certain modifications which offset the
unfair advantages of certain categories of luck and natural
talents. The market serves this purpose, says, Dworkin,
because it takes into account automatically the costs of
one's choices in terms of how they affect everyone else.
Thus it gives choices, as it were, a "just price." It also,
unlike such an inflexible-seeming schema as is implied in
Rawls's Difference Principle (which seems to focus on the
quantities of material resources which people end up
holding), is perfectly suited to the inordinately various
tastes, preferences, and capabilities that guide individuals
in their pursuit of what they hope will make them happy. A
person, by virtue of the subtleties in his make-up, may well
prefer more leisure time to some arbitrary level of income.
Rawls, he implies, gives "equal treatment" when he should
treat each "as an equal." The first approach seems to yoke
everyone to a universal formula of end-state material
means, whereas the second respects the huge differences in
persons' consumptive tastes and choices of pastime. In
effect, Dworkin argues, the second approach more genuinely
respects the autonomy of the individual in leading his own
life.
It may sound, then, as if Dworkin would have more room
for the more unambitious agrarian I have described since what
that putterer seeks is not so much material advantages as a
proper balance among material and non-material dimensions of
life. But one should not move so fast. For if what I have
remarked above is correct, then--since what the agrarian can
"afford" to do may all depend on what everyone else is doing
(instead of on a universal distributional formula)--
the slow homebody may have "priced" his mediocrity out of
the market. The net effect of everyone else's preferences
may be to exclude his preferences: to make their costs
prohibitively expensive. This seems to be, in fact, the
likelihood as I have depicted it above. This is not a
definite possibility, to be sure, but all the same it is a
highly conceivable one, and since it all depends on forces
external to the party in question, this person's fate is
precarious. Dworkin replaces "rigidity" with uncertainty.
Dworkin does allude, however, to other possible grounds
on which such a farmer's life may be protected--namely the
grounds of a "public good"--but I will discuss this notion
later. 27
The compartments: decreasing the accessibility of the
"whole li fe" and (quite possibly) the prospects of
psychological and sociological health. And thus we come
again--maybe whether we want to or not--to modern specialized
society. Bear in mind in what follows, however, that the
compartmentalization and inconvenience that result are only
comparative, and are apparent only when set against the
relative unity of a group like the Amish--a unity that
doubtless pales in turn, on comparison with that of other
groups (and note: it may be possible to have too little
compartmentalization too).
Thus, Rawls cannot be gainsaid when he states, in a
passage that would seem to accept favorably most modern
divisions of labor and of other activities,
2 7
"Liberalism," in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass..
Harvard University Press, 1978). I owe much of this interpretation
to the ideas of David 0. Brink.
. . . the Aristotelian Principle holds for
institutional forms as well as for any other
human activity. Seen in this light, a just
constitutional order, when adjoined to the
smaller social unions of everyday life, provides
a framework for these many associations and sets
up the most complex and diverse activity of all.
In a well-ordered society each person understands
the first principles that govern the whole scheme
as it is to be carried out over many generations,
and all have a settled intention to adhere to these
principles in their plan of life. . . .
. . . the publ c realization of justice is a
value of community.
Rawls even goes so far as to correct "the worst aspects" of
the division of labor: "no one need be servilely dependent
on others and made to choose between monotonous and routine
occupations which are deadening to human thought and
sensibility. Each can be offered a variety of tasks so that
the different elements of his nature find a suitable
expression."29 But as Rawls goes on to say, these
allowances still make ample room for myriad other social
subdivisions (and there would seem to be an unresolved
tension between the assurance made above and the reality of
modern economic pressures that seem to be allowed). Thus,
Rawls's "union of social unions" nonetheless enwraps a
society which is comparatively less internally integrated
than the alternative in view.
What does this mean for the individual in pursuit of his
good, and in particular, of his "familiar values"? Now, all
280p. cit., p.529.
29 Ibid., p.529.
of the same three or four functionings blent together, say, in
Amish work (see p.14 above and next section) are separated.
There may be some overlap among compartments, yes, because the
loss of integration is relative. So when looking at the
following specializations (not excluded by Rawls's limits)
which are fundamental to the socio-economic structure we are
all so familiar with, one is really looking at tendencies:
The home specializes in personal affection.
The gymnasium or joggers' track specializes in physical
exertion.
The work place specializes (for the fortunate) in
rational analysis, judgment, or perhaps creativity.
The classroom or church specializes in the same or
somewhat "higher" mental and spiritual concerns.
These are the specializations. What are the
compartmentalizations that follow?
The home is intensely personal (or at least is supposed
to be), while the work place, church or classroom, and gym are
relatively impersonal or even coldly competitive (thus making
understandable expressions like "it's a jungle out there"; a
"dog-eat-dog world"; a "rat-race.")
Also, the gym is physically invigorating, but,
relatively speaking, not the home, work place, or classroom.
Finally, the work place (if fortunate), classroom, or
church stimulate rational, creative, and contemplative
development; but not the home or the gym (hence those
-1
disparaging descriptions of the housewife as "barefoot and
pregnant").
Given the separation of these key "functionings," a
relative increase occurs in the three barriers of
compartmentalization cited above: absence of handiness, of
density, and of unifying consistency. These losses (most
concretely, the first two) contribute to the infelicities
already mentioned affecting those seeking a "whole life"
(whether explicitly or implicitly), and most severely, those
susceptible to sundry psychological and social ills.
Related issues: A trade-off between depth and breadth?
One of the key assumptions attached to Rawls's notion of
primary goods, which people require to advance their
conceptions of the good, is that, since they are considered
neutral "means," it is better to have more than less of them.
Even if (once the veil of ignorance is removed) recipients
ultimately choose not to make use of the extra, the greater
amount is said to "enlarge their means for promoting their
aims whatever these are." 30 As I will attempt to show, this
is not as benign an assumption as it may seem. In the social
structure realized on its basis, it may work so as to shrink
these "means" in some respects while enlarging them; and it
may do so at greater cost to some persons than to others.
30Op. cit., p.143.
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others. (Admittedly, Rawls includes a ceteris paribus
clause;31 so my critique becomes an identification of some
untoward outside factors that would modify the way primary
goods are worked out in the theory).
Now one primary good is opportunity, 32 and this is
surely enhanced not only in the way Rawls specifically
emphasizes, namely by keeping "positions and offices open to
all." 33 As hinted above (p.35) it is also increased in a way
that Rawls does not explicitly stress: by increasing the
division of labor, which increases in turn the number and
variety of "positions and offices." (Rawls does suppose a
"background of diverse opportunities" ). And whether he
intends it or not, this second enlargement is performed for
him by the stupendous specialization that he allows to issue
from his coupling of the Aristotelian Principle to a
competitive free market. But then if all this is true, and if
my observations on the troublesome tendencies of that
specialization are valid, then Rawls fails to draw attention
to something else. It is this: as opportunity for life-plans
expands, the achievable depth of life-plans shrinks, insofar




34Priority. . . ," op. cit., p.257.
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compartmentalization, because the specialization scatters
desirable values making them harder to obtain and integrate.
This trade-off may be significant whether or not it results in
psychological debilitation, although in this eventuality it
displays its most serious ramifications for justice. And
thus, depth may be sacrificed for breadth.
Would Sen's substitution of "functionings" and
"capability sets" for "primary goods," "values," and
alternative "life-plans" be of any help (see also account of
Sen below, p.51-2)? Since they are perhaps more sensitive to
substantive freedoms, the answer is yes, so far as it goes.
A person's "capability set" 35 is composed of various
"functioning"-bundles, each of which represents a possible
life the person could actually attain.36 Although it would
be up to the person to carry that life out, there is no grey
area between means and a person's ability to make use of those
means. Thus if a person's opportunity actually to achieve
different lives (capability set) increased in size only by a
decrease in the fullness of each actually achievable life
(size of the functioning bundle), that trade-off would be
detected. The capability set, though larger, would be made up
of smaller members. But Sen has not supplied any criteria by
35only Sen's "well-being freedom" is relevant here, not "agency
freedom," so I will not muddy the discussion with the distinction
between the two.
36
"The Territory of Justice," p.8.
which to decide between breadth and depth of capability, or to
consider the significance of a trade-off between these two
phenomena. His concern (as noted below) is to correct for
individual variation in persons' capacities to make use of
"primary goods." Yet since the decrease of depth due to
specialization is a social phenomenon, it would diminish
everybody's capacity. It remains to be seen whether Sen is
interested in a generalized trade-off.
A fourth disadvantaged group. Still, Sen's concern
points us to an easily overlooked, but possibly staggering,
inequality aggravated by an amazing subdivision of labor.
I have already mentioned possible injustices dealt to whole-
life seekers (both explicit and implicit) and to persons
susceptible to certain psychological or sociological ills.
There is another overlapping group. This indeterminate
constituency would consist of those individuals comparatively
less agile in navigating among compartments, "shifting
gears," going here and there to meet this or that goal, and
not losing their way or presence of mind. It seems highly
unlikely that everyone is equally gifted in these skills.
The system literally would leave the less-so in the lurch.
Psychological and social ills. Assuming compartmental-
ization brings on a high risk of an increase in psychological
and social pathologies, how well can Rawlsian theory, as it
stands, accommodate these problems? Now that we have a better
idea of the degree of compartmentalization in a "Rawlsian
society," we are in a better position to examine the secondary
effects. Consider now only one possible case, that of
depression.
It is the reciprocal trait of psychological states to
behave not only as effects or outcomes but as causes or
preconditions of behavior themselves. Thus, the depression,
say, that may result from a person's inability to attain his
life's goals may, in turn, incapacitate that person from
further pursuit thereof, and even from any participation in
the democratic life of society. The effect would be the same
as subtracting a primary good, and it would over time
undermine the stability of the system by robbing it of its
supporters. In fact, the misfortune would subtract what Rawls
has called a "natural" primary good, if we use his distinction
between this and a "social" primary good.37 But if we go this
far, since I am speaking of mental capacity inasmuch as it is
or can be directly affected by the basic social structure,
then it would be better to call it a full-fledged social
primary good. Rawls allows for the eventual possibility of
expanding (social) primary goods to include "the absence of




absence of psychological incapacity?" If so, this would seem
a corrective, at least at first glance.
Yet in the first place, there are some practical
problems. Assuming that such a remedy could be applied only
after the ailment surfaced (of course, before that, how could
anyone identify the problem?) it is not clear that
psychological debilitation can be reversed, whether taken to
the degree of moral incapacity or not. Certainly, it could
not be with the same sureness as physical pain generally can
be. And even if it can be, there is another problem. If we
take into account, for instance, the millions or tens of
millions of people who appear to be suffering from it in
modern societies (it has been said to be the precipitant of a
large portion of the increasing homeless population), then it
appears there may well not be enough mental health personnel
and agencies to go around, particularly of the quality
(not of this world) it would take to achieve satisfying
recovery in every case. The problem may be more serious
still: if the psychological discontent is endemic to the
basic socio-economic structure and in part the underlying
moral psychology of the Theory of Justice (as I am here
supposing), then such clinical efforts may be superficial and
ineffectual: they would be treating the symptoms and not the
disease. For a genuine resolution, it may take some
modification of those fundamentals themselves.
Those were the practical complications; there is also at
least one ethical one. This is the notion that we would all
share fairly, due to the fair distribution of primary goods,
in any psychological consequences of Rawls's envisioned
political society. This was the saving grace here postulated
that would help make his political conception of justice seem
the lesser of evils. Yet few assumptions could be more
dubious. It seems highly unlikely that all people are
equally naturally susceptible to psychological distress;
rather it would appear far more probable that there is a
large range in the degrees of such vulnerabilities. (These
weaknesses might be owing to genetic, environmental, or
elusive temperamental differences--it doesn't matter). A
system that is uniformly prone to bring out these maladies
thereby discriminates against people more prone to come down
with them. To be sure, Rawls speaks, for example, of "the
absence of physical pain" as a potential primary good, and so
it appears that a primary good might guarantee a total
compensation, regardless of individual differences (and of
social impracticalities).
One possible objection to this provision comes from
Amartya Sen. He has suggested that in general Rawls's notions
of primary goods are at best equivocal, and at worst singly
focused on equality of means rather than of freedoms actually
to realize bundles of "functionings" (i.e. "doings" and
"beings").9 Thus they are insensitive to individual
differences in the capacity to make use of those means.
Thus, for instance, under Rawls it would not be clear to Sen
whether, instead of possibly guaranteeing the provision for a
full mental recovery they might merely guarantee, say,
roughly one visit to a psychiatrist a month for every
citizen--a measure that would be superfluous in the case of
the mentally well and insufficient in the case of the
mentally sick. Yet in his "Reply to Sen" (unpublished) Rawls
makes a convincing case that such eventualities would be
adequately covered by his theory because, for example, it
presupposes certain basic moral capabilities which in turn
require minimum health levels. Besides, he says, primary
goods are indexed by expectations, thus are even more
stretchable.
Nevertheless, even if total provision for a full
recovery were extended, and even if such were practically
feasible in clinical terms, there is another possible
objection: an important inequality remains. We are not
talking about setting a broken leg or removing an appendix.
Again, psychological ailments can be troublingly intractable.
Even if possible, recovery can be slow, torturous, and
precarious (especially in cases compounded by substance-
abuse). Is it fair to ask only some and not others to
3"The Territory of Justice," p.8 and p.23.
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undergo such a dangerous ordeal? Would not prevention be
fairer? This points to a closer look at what may be the root
of the problem, then: social and economic structures pre-
supposed in the Theory of Justice and endemic to modern life.
One way better to grasp these problems is in the light
of a less-compartmentalized alternative.
Section III -- Part I
The Amish. As the example of the Amish should show, the
absence of compartmentalization permits convenience and
quality of life in areas where technological society lacks
them--namely in handiness, density, and meaningful continuity
(digestibility) mentioned above (or rather negatively
implied). If I am correct, this felicity not only increases
overall liberty (in the special respects I have demarcated),
it also decreases damage that might be done to those among the
Amish (as with hypothetical extra-Amish parties) susceptible
in the various respects described above, or to the prospects
of any "whole-life" seekers (explicit or implicit), thus
preempting the associated unfairnesses.
Amish time is divided roughly between two activities,
work and recreation. These amount to densely interwoven
unions of Rawls's "human goods."
I. Work.
Personal affection: a) Husband and wife. It would (of
course) be a mistake to view the traditional Amish home as
nothing but a bastion of serenity and social harmony. In the
course of three summers' residence as a hand in an Amish
home, I've seen Amish fathers quarrel with Amish mothers and
Amish children disobey their parents. In the aftermath, I've
sat through long evenings of uncomfortable silence.
Nevertheless, such breaches in the social fabric tended to be
rewoven by the common interests and interrelated tasks that,
in part, unite the parental pair. True, there was a clear
division of roles, with the man doing the hard physical work
and the woman the household and gardening tasks. But since
the work took place on the same premises (instead of being
spaced miles apart in separate cubicles), it was easy for
them to see and feel the necessity and complementarity of the
contributions they each were making to the vital enterprise
of the household. The wife cooked the meals, but the husband
cured the sausage which she served and fixed the sink from
which she drew water. The wife washed the clothes, but the
husband kept the old-fashioned washing machine and pump in
repair. In fact, wife and daughters were always on call to
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help in the fields if help was needed. By the end of the
season when the crop was ready to be sold and hauled away, it
embodied the united efforts of husband, wife, and the
children. On the framework formed by these practical
interactions, it was only natural for Amish husbands and
wives to develop a subtle, unspoken understanding. Although
Amish spouses are not known to be emotionally demonstrative in
public (from a distance, a typical couple resembles the pair
in the American Gothic), it was not uncommon in the privacy of
the home to witness outward displays of affection. One time,
for example, after Father came in from a hard day's work,
Mother confronted him saying, "Eric said the hay feels hot in
the barn. [Readers should realize that when hay is put away
damp, it can spontaneously combust]. Maybe you'd better go
look at it." Father gazed at her intently. "Why would I go
out and look at hay," he said in a low voice, "when I can stay
here and look at you?" There was a lengthy amplification of
this amorous negotiation. Cooperation in work was an
important thread strengthening the marital bond. Divorce, by
the way, is virtually unheard-of among the Amish. (This is a
phenomenon probable not explicable on grounds of religion
alone, since divorce is low generally speaking among non-
industrialized peoples, but nearing the 50% rate among both
Protestants and Catholics in the modern West).
b) Children. On the farm, Amish parents literally use
their work as a way of raising their children, training,
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teaching, and nurturing them by their presence and through
the disciplined interactions with plants and animals.
Conveniently in the process, children become skilled farmers
and potential parents themselves, ready to hand down the
lessons to the next generation. One day a wagon pulled into
the farm overflowing with people. All were members of the
Stoltzfus family, and there were at least eight of them.
They had come to get some extra seedlings to transplant to
their own farm. Three of the children, Emma, Sol, and Sim,
were too young to be much good at selecting and uprooting
choice plants, so they commandeered me to give them a tour of
the farm. I showed them the chickens, the turkeys, the
newborn piglets, and the sows. This was much to their
fascination. Soon they were asking me where I was from, what
I was doing here, and what I did for a living. They were all
under age ten, I was twenty-two, and we were having a
conversation. Later when weeding in the garden by myself, I
suddenly became sensible of the presence of the eight-year-
old beside me. He was manfully tugging a weed larger than he
was. After I thanked him, he responded, "Work first, then
play, and you'll be happy all the day."
c) Grandparents. Grandparents usually live on or near
the premises, and help out here and there where they can. As
important members of the extended family, they provide
relations and emotional cushions where the parents may be
lacking.
d) Neighbors. Amish life would have been inconceivable
without a tight meshwork of mutual assistance. In my own
experience, not a day passed without some form of barter
between neighbors, either in goods or services, or without
the accompanying exchange of good spirits. The sorghum and
wheat harvests entailed some of the heaviest sustained labor
I endured, yet because they occasioned friendly reunions they
were also among the most fondly anticipated tasks. Close
community ties added support to Amish marriages.
Invigoration: the integrating role of manual work. A
common thread tying all of these interactions together is
manual work. It might be worthwhile to say a few words about
physical drudgery on the farm, in part, to meet some possible
criticisms.40 I have thus far spent three summers working--
often from dawn until dusk--as a live-in farm hand with the
Amish. My personal findings significantly modify prevailing
stereotypes on the nature of agrarian toil. (I also draw on
some survey data).
All human endeavors involve a certain amount of
repetition. Farming is no exception. Yet it probably
entails less than most common modern occupations. In answer
to the question, "Do you enjoy your work so much you have a
hard time putting it down?", farmers gave far more "yes"
responses than any other working group, including
40A Theory of Justice, op. cit., p.429.
"business/professional." And they did so more in 1955 than
in 1980. 1955 was a time when far less machinery relieved
them of manual work.41 Amish expert John Hostetler estimates
that today, virtually 100 percent of Amish farmers would give
an affirmative reply (personal interview).
There may be more than one reason for this surprise.
The first thing is the type of repetition. Modern tasks tend
to require mental repetition. Farming is physical. This
does two things.
To begin with, as it becomes habitual, work actually
frees up the mind to venture about as it will--in conversation
with co-workers, daydreams, appreciation of natural
surroundings, contemplation, or perhaps even some misty
composite of all four. Or it can simply rest. That is the
first advantage of physicality.
In the second place, physical activity is invigorating.
It helps circulate blood to every furthest capillary. It
relaxes muscles and keeps them limber. It provides--like the
heart itself--both nutrition and a sort of rhythm enlivening
mental processes. You can even sing to its beat, and some
Amish people do! By contrast, sedentary mental repetition
can actually jam up the mind while it stymies the physical
pulse. (This is one reason why I have my doubts about the
so-called "electronic cottage").
41Norval D. Glenn and Charles N. Weaver, Public Opinion
Quarterly, (v.46, Winter 1982), pp.459-70.
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For both of these reasons, far from an obstacle to
personal fulfillments, repetitious work acts as a catalyst of
them--a stimulus and framework in which various functionings
can be simultaneously overlaid and realized. (It is true
that too much onerous physical work can be stunting in every
way, but such work is characteristic not of family farms but
historically of certain types of inorganic environments, such
as mines and certain kinds of manufacture).
As for the second major cause of farmer-satisfaction,
besides the type of repetition is the extent. Because
farming is a totalistic occupation, the key principle in play
is not specialization, but the opposite: variation. The
farmer oversees his own mini-economy. As I see it, the main
challenge is not the monotony, but something nearly
antithetical: the unpredictability. I was astonished how in
my own duties as a hand I rarely did the same job any two
days in a week. A society trained as specialists would find
it liberating, but also disconcerting, to have to balance and
coordinate a diversity of tasks, within a larger agenda set
by weather and the seasons. This brings me to the final
major category of functionings being traced.
Aesthetic and intellectual engagement. a) The challenge
of manager. The judgment of both the Amish farmer and his
wife is constantly called upon. Like business managers, they
face decisions hour by hour, day by day, week by week, month
by month, and year by year, related to the different levels
of their operations as these are affected by the weather and
sometimes by market conditions. They conceive and implement
the appropriate plans, organize and oversee a crew (both
human and non-), and with its help bring those plans to
fruition.
b) Manual skill and creativity. Unlike many other
managers, the farmer frequently weds mental and physical
operations, often in ways that call upon refined skills and
creativity. This happens not only in certain ordinary chores,
but also farm repairs and craft sidelines like cabinetry and
carpentry.
c) Opportunities for contemplation. There is no way to
measure or observe contemplation in the act. However, unless
they are unusually demanding, farming or household chores
often provide just the kind of mindless physical rhythms
which are good undercurrents for mental reflection. And they
are often set against a beautiful backdrop of natural scenery
accompanied by soothing sounds and pleasant aromas (when away
from the pigpen). I can only speak for myself, but while
weeding, shelling peas, or driving horses, I frequently
drifted off into pleasant daydreams. How large a subset of
these were contemplative, however, given the nature of the
process, I cannot assess or recollect.
In addition, the slow winter months provide many
occasions for fireside reading. But I am anticipating the
next section.
II. Recreation. Now that the principle is established,
there is less need to spend time on examples. In recreation
the Amish exhibit the same densely interwoven crosscut of
functionings--affective, aesthetic, intellectual--often
catalyzed or reinforced by physical movement. We may
recognize this confluence ourselves in our own forms of
recreation, for the Amish engage in the same kinds we do: fun
and games, field sports, singing, dancing, reading, letter-
writing, and religious worship (here one additional form of
recreation--sleep--often becomes a communal experience!) The
complementary relationship of work with recreation
should be obvious. The two interlock to form a larger
experiential whole through time--the work-rest cycle. Moving
from one to the other yields a delicious sense of contrast.
III. Costs. To say that the Amish farmer's life
abounds in variety and density of experience is not to say it
is for everybody. It discourages precisely, for example, the
single-minded or highly refined and specialized pursuits which
thrive in modern fragmented society. While it may be
suitable to cultivating a general wisdom or meditative
disposition (Socrates and Jesus were both hand laborers), a
full time farmer could hardly lead a simultaneous career as a
concert pianist, a professor at a prestigious university, or
a laboratory research scientist (though all three could more
easily be part-time gardeners). Farmers simply don't have
the time (I doubt the winter off-season would be enough) to
devote to maintaining professionalism, and farming areas tend
to lack the necessary facilities and personnel. They usually
are located far from the cultural or research centers that
traditionally have generated these pastimes. Bright Amish
youth learn this lesson the hard way. Their talents and wits
sometimes find little sustenance amid the wheat shocks and
lead them to abandon their heritage (although as we shall
see, this may be due less to agrarianism than to an
idiosyncratic factor I will discuss below). While a few
return to pastoralism after getting an advanced education,
others become doctors, professors, and business executives
for whom full time agriculture is and incompatible pastime.
Contrarily, a city-bred college professor I know tried to
lead the "good life" and run a ranch while fulfilling his
professional obligations--only to ruin the ranch. The lesson
seems to be: the city mouse and country mouse must make up
their minds. But they must also have the opportunity to
travel on the roads of their own choosing.
Section III -- Part 2
Further depth of choice for the "whole life." So far
I have examined the benefits of an integrated life inasmuch as
it affects the ease of carrying out choices. I implied that
more activities or aspects of life may readily and
satisfyingly be indulged in and savored if barriers of
compartmentalization (spatial, temporal, and qualitative) are
absent--in a word, permitting greater depth of choice.
But I have yet to examine the faculty of choice itself.
To what extent can one make a choice in the first place?
Consider as a backdrop what may be the Achilles tendon of the
modern world: why, in our land of opportunity, would it be
so difficult for someone without special assistance to begin
to lead a life as an unambitious, well-rounded farmer? The
pressures from specialized competition are one factor, yes, as
we have seen, but what is the source of this impasse? Does
intensely technical competition fall within a larger pattern
of phenomena related to compartmentalization? And do these
phenomena also tend to restrict individuals' capacities to
make choices? If the answer is yes, then there is even
greater cause to suppose, say, Seligman's "learned
helplessness" as an explanation of modern depression. But I
will let the reader fill in the pieces of that speculation.
How could compartmentalization go hand in hand with
inability to make choices? The answer I will propose is this:
even as it impedes the realization of sundry goals and values,
compartmentalization also removes pieces of life from
individuals' direct control. This is because it places these
elements out of reach not only physically, but also in the
same stroke, as it were, administratively. If, as I argued,
compartmentalization is really just the experiential
implication of specialization, specialization also implies
smaller and smaller "fields" of personal jurisdiction. The
focus of one's efforts takes in a smaller and smaller field of
controlled elements, and by design or default, other persons
or events end up "making decisions" for one, namely in the
many areas affecting one's life one is not focusing on--that
is, the remainder of one's life. A life of small, specialized
activities is prey to the commands and strictures of immense,
compartmentalized organizations (to which these activities are
designedly subordinated) and to the imperatives of the
marketplace (a system representing the uneasy marriage of
limited economic planning and happenstance).
The word "field" is meant here in part literally. Long
ago Thomas Jefferson contrasted the self-mastery of the
independent country yeoman with the subservience of the city
laborer. At root, I believe, he was forewarning of life of
specialized pastimes in which other persons (often hidden from
view) or adventitious circumstance orchestrated and
effectively controlled huge aspects of an individual's
destiny. And today, as if in fulfillment of Jefferson's
admonition, even upper-level managers must take commands
issued down in a long chain from higher, unseen tiers in their
organization--or be fired. Every Amish farmer, meanwhile,
remains his own boss and co-writes the code of governing
ordinances for the community in which he resides and conducts
business. The Amish, since they do not specialize greatly and
are self-sufficient on the whole, directly oversee and control
most of the vital components of their existence.42 (How in
greater detail the Amish have succeeded in spite of commercial
pressures, where my hypothetical farmer failed, is a subject
that will be explored both immediately below and later on in
the paper in a discussion of current governmental policies
that exclusively benefit the Amish. But note one thing to be
mentioned immediately below: he was not part of a supportive
and semi-self-sufficient community that buffered competition.)
The key difference separating the two cases is whether
one's most vigorous relationship is to a part or to the whole.
Instead of being a cog in the larger economy, each Amish
farmer manages his own mini-economy which he thereby of course
can control largely as he sees fit. At the same time, he
belongs to a supportive community deliberately limited in size
to 25 to 50 families--which thereby he also readily may help
govern. Small size gives him a tighter relationship to the
42Actually, a study performed by Lester M. Salamon provides
dramatic evidence directly in support of the psychological benefits
of agrarian self-mastery. Independent black farmers who owned
their own land thanks to New Deal land-reform programs showed
significantly higher confidence in their ability to shape their
lives, and at the same time, lower hypertension and better health
than other more dependent local blacks. These blacks, Salamon
points out, created a stronghold of support for the Civil Rights
movement in the South. See "The Time Dimension in Policy
Evaluation: The Case of the New Deal Land-Reform Experiments,"
Public Policy, 27(2), Spring 1979, pp.129-83.
whole community. I would venture that in a large-scale
industrial enterprise, even if "democratically" organized, the
ratio of one's input to the net decision-making outcome is so
tiny as almost not worth registering. Certainly this is the
tendency we see in labor unions (I am a former teamster--I
know). And at any rate, the pressure to achieve efficient
coordination among the functions of the enterprise--which
itself occupies a competitive niche in the larger industrial
economy--sharply straitens both individual and joint choices.
I would posit a basic rule: the smaller and more
subordinate one's specialty within the whole, or one's role
within the specialized compartment, the less leverage one
exerts over the elements of one's life affected by that whole.
Interestingly, in spite of the imposition of certain
autocratic political or socio-economic arrangements, it
appears that individuals retain large realms of personal
autonomy when they do not overly specialize. Under feudalism,
for instance, the serf had no taskmaster standing over him all
day long, but was his own manager. Though he was chained to
the land, that land also gave him a domain for his autonomy.
He could not make the major decision whether to leave or not,
but he was closely in touch with all of the important factors
affecting his life on a day-to-day basis, and was thereby able
to be seated in command over them, or at least have direct
influence over them. A robust proximity to the "whole" gave
the serf leverage.
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In society like ours, by contrast, one travels about
and dips into small crevices of large-scale systems over which
one has only the most oblique knowledge and control. Such
large-scale systems include not only the competitive
market-economy and corporate enterprise, but governmental
bureaucracy, education public and private, and the
entertainment industry--the last of which makes even one's
living room, when the television set is on, a branch outlet
for national advertising and corporate-controlled
opinion-molding. One cannot possibly exert the same leverage
over these systems that one enjoys in a more "holistic"
milieu.
One moves either between or within small cubicles
whereupon one either is borne along more-or-less passively by
modern transportation systems (in a cubicle too) or is
pressured or even commanded (within the cubicle of one's
destination) to conform to some agenda worked out by a
collectivity of persons and activities distantly removed from
one's life. This is because the cubicle occupies a
subordinate and small position within the totality of
interlocking elements that make up the whole.
From all this it follows that not only the work place,
indeed, but any place is the occasion of a loss of personal
control. In modern society everywhere we see distant and/or
large-scale entities literally taking over the vital functions
of our lives and removing control and decision-making from the
"grass roots." Technologists and technology, government
bureaucracy, economic and educational systems, even television
and other media effectively make decisions that compromise
individual say over the most intimate aspects of family and
community living. On such dangers, Rawls has issued only the
faintest of warnings (see above p.43).
Once again, the issues become clearer when examined in
light of the Amish success.
The Amish adult as his/her own boss. The independence
of the Amish farmer depends on both himself as an individual
in the management of his own affairs and his collegial
relationship to other members of the community in enacting
rules governing their common conduct:
a) At the homestead. Some mention has been made of the
extensive responsibilities of the farmer or farmer's wife in
overseeing their multi-faceted, semi-self-sufficient
operations. Another word for such responsibility is freedom.
To be responsible for one's own destiny in this way, is not
continually to have to take orders from someone else or have
no idea who is making important decisions for you.
Interestingly, it was considered the highest praise in
Lancaster County for someone to say of the farmer's wife:
"She's a real manager." The matron of the household I worked
at was so skilled that, after her children grew up, a large
nearby supermarket (non-Amish-run) hired her as a supervisor.
The responsibilities of the Amish farmer I worked for in
Kentucky were quite demanding, in a way that I will elaborate
below.
The Amish exert great personal control over not only
their "business" but, for example, as we have seen, how their
children are raised. Amish youth are not the wards of large
scale education-processing systems over which parents have
only the remotest influence, nor prisoners of peer opinion (a
system of conformity all its own) since contact with other
youth is moderated by continual adult involvement, nor
hostages of entertainment or propaganda concocted in the
board rooms of national broadcasting and advertising firms--
since Amish watch no TV. Such parental control is of
inestimable value in preempting the causes mentioned above of
alienation of youth. In short, young Amish lives are closely
enmeshed with the primary "nerve-centers" of their
development, and these "centers" (their parents) in turn,
moderate all the other important factors that affect them.
b) The Amish farmer as a boss among equals who coauthor
the code of their lives. By writing the rules of their own
community, the Amish prevent external forces of technology
and economics from ruling them. Here, incidentally, we see
one of the greatest assets, foretold above, enabling the Amish
to survive in a complex, competitive world. How to get such
a decision-making process going from scratch and habituating
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a collection of diverse "modern" individuals to it poses a
singular challenge to the Amish-emulator. To try to initiate
such a tradition among neophytes--along with all the other
"traditions" they would have to learn--almost would be like
trying to get the fragmented parts of an organism, once dead,
to spring back into a living synchrony. Group decision-
making is one of the most complex forms of human inter-
coordination, and lies at the core of Amish success. (Note
however: in many larger Amish settlements, much of the
decision-making may be conducted by a council of bishops who
represent their individual districts.)
In this decision-making process, because the group is
kept small (25 to 50 families) and everyone has an
approximately equal say, the individual farmer usually has a
large leverage over the "forces" affecting him. It is hard to
imagine greater personal control amid cooperation.
In the Hoover Old Order Mennonite community (Old Order
Mennonites are virtually equivalent to the Amish) in which I
worked as a hand for two summers, the process calls on the
direct participation of all members (any baptized adult). At
the same time, non-members are excluded even from witnessing
it. The group, I have been told, will assemble in a closed
council and, in order of declining age, allow each man (women
enjoying voting rights only) the turn to air his opinion on
the agenda at hand. When all viewpoints have been expressed,
if there appears to be a general consensus, the bishop (who
presides over the affair) will proclaim it with such an
introduction as, "It looks like we've decided that--." If
there have been some dissenters, these usually defer to the
wisdom of the majority and humbly concede, "Well, it doesn't
suit me just right, but I'll go ahead and. . ." Any strong
disagreement, if not resolved in subsequent councils, will
likely lead either to voluntary fission or excommunication of
the contentious party--an infrequent but real possibility.
The problem of serious internal disagreement will be explored
in greater depth below. For now, look at an example of how
one decision was arrived at.
The telephone. The particular decision I am
considering, as a case well-illustrating Amish governing
processes, is one which forbid use of non-Amish neighbors'
telephones (the Amish may own none themselves) except in
emergencies and which decreed that, to meet the resurging
demand, a central community pay-phone be installed for non-
emergency (or emergency) calls.
Why, at the same time, did the Amish so tightly restrict
the use of the phone, and yet deliberately make available one
phone for community use? Generally speaking, all Amish
groups ban phone-ownership and for the same three or four
stated reasons they ban automobile ownership (while here
again, certain forms of public transportation are allowed,
such as buses and trains):
1. The phone (like the car) is generally speaking an
unjustifiable and costly luxury that has no pressing
practical use. (The ban in many communities on indoor
toilets more clearly demonstrates the same principle of
luxury-avoidance).
2. The phone (like the car) would probably trigger a
"keep-up-with-the-Jones's" mania (that phrase was actually
used). The first buyer would, in effect, be flaunting a
possession that would represent a brazen assertion of his own
ego (or Hochmut as the Amish call it) and tempt everyone else
to follow suit for the sake of personal pride.
3. The phone (like the car) would reduce community
cohesion. By vastly and artificially enlarging the radius of
human contact, it would eliminate the need to rely on and
form bonds with one's immediate Amish neighbors, whether for
practical assistance or friendship. This is perhaps the most
important reason. Yet it is closely connected to the last
one.
4. By tying users closely to the wider world, the phone
(like the car) would ensnare them in worldly concerns and
pressures--the very "forces" that I mentioned above. The
term the Amish frequently use is "the rat race." In fact, in
the Mennonite community I worked in, serious consideration
was being given on this ground to severing connections with
the one phone they had allowed.43 This brings us to the
question, why was the solitary pay phone installed at all?
The telephone illustrates not only Amish
restrictiveness, but also permissiveness in using modern
technology. In a word, the Amish are intelligently
discriminating in the way they choose and apply technical
advances. They are not averse a) to enjoying what they
consider to be a real benefit both to the individual and the
the community (e.g., select medical advances and kinds of
mass-produced items for household and farm use); and b) to
adapting to worldly changes when this seems necessary or
prudent in increasing the likelihood of their survival. It
is important here to note that the Amish do sell their crops
on the market and thus are in competition with users of
large-scale machinery--with whom surprisingly they manage to
keep up (if the crop is labor-intensive). But this means an
occasional concession. Such was the pay telephone.
The practical, pressing use of the pay telephone was to
link up and tightly coordinate community produce shipments
with large-scale buyers representing regional supermarket
chains. A last-minute change in events without access to the
43This community was unusually methodical and conscientious--
some would say perfectionistic or even puritanical--in deciding its
rules. John Hostetler implies this is not surprising in a new
Amish settlement starting off on "new ground" as mine was. More
typically, however, and in older settlements, the reasons behind
technological adoptions are messier. See his book Amish Society
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p.364 and
pp.354-61.
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telephone could have meant disaster--a wasted crop or the
pointless arrival of a semi-trailer truck and no more future
dealings with that buyer. I helped pack thousands of
cantaloupes into boxes at the central community loading dock
(designed just for receipt of a "semi"), and it would have
been quite distressing if the truck never had showed up or had
come eight hours early.
For all that, the community was considering eliminating
the phone. It found that once the line (so to speak) was
crossed, it was quite difficult for users who coordinated
long-distance shipments to keep from establishing tighter and
tighter links with urban merchants and in effect become their
hostages. Phone users were getting caught up in the "rat
race," making daily trips to the phone, arranging intricate
business deals, and building castles of paper. The community
wanted to say "no,1" or at least in some way contain this
spillage.
It was, incidentally, only by accident that I found out
the contents of the council in which this issue was being
discussed (since meetings are closed). One day I asked
a fellow who had kept me waiting where he'd come from and why
he's spent so much time there. "In council--didn't you
know?" he replied.
"What was the meeting about?" I quickly returned.
He hemmed and hawed. I continued to stare at him. Then
he sighed, shrugged his shoulders, and told me. I tried to
keep it a secret.
Choice is not necessarily all it's cracked up to be.
If what I am saying holds true, the implication is rather
odd. It would mean that millions or even hundreds of
millions of people in the modern world have been drastically
stunted in the power to make any meaningful choices (not to
mention move in an environment in which they can propitiously
realize their choices) and surrender large amounts of their
autonomy to industrial taskmasters44 or to the blind
pressures of technology and economics impinging on them
externally (or in the case, say, of child-rearing, to
impersonal school systems and government agencies), and in
the main, lodge themselves in cubbyholes of a super-
technological mechanism that severely abridges the realm of
control over their own lives. And yet we see no one dragging
them backwards kicking toward this prisonhouse. How can this
44A predicament given some dimensions by the study cited above.
Measured by the same poll revealing farmer satisfaction, the modern
laborer does not seem overly contented at work. In answer to the
question, "Do you enjoy your work so much you have a hard time
putting it down," most non-farming respondents said "no." And
there seemed to be an overall decline in work enjoyment since 1955-
-a period during which specialization and compartmentalization were




Manual laborers 50.0% 27.1%
Clerks/Sales help 43.2% 24.9%
overall 51.7% 33.5%
disparity be explained? We are "prisoners," yet we don't
revolt--and even consider ourselves "free."
one possible way to account for this enigma is a certain
attraction of choicelessness. If people had the choice, many
might choose not to have to choose. In this light, the very
beauty of modern compartments is that all of the important
decisions have already been made for the occupant.
With choice comes responsibility, and with
responsibility, mental fatigue, incessant worry, headaches,
ulcers, short tempers, self-blame, blame of others, blame of
circumstance, and above all in the case of the farmer, blame
of "Mother Nature" who in her sublime fickleness seems always
to be tossing out the most irksome changes of plan, and
invariably without giving reasonable notice. (The farmer may
wonder who is the harsher taskmaster--man or nature). Having
continually to make important choices is a lot of work. It
also makes life less secure inasmuch as one must rely wholly
on oneself or one's neighbors, and on the unsteadiness of
nature, for one's well-being. Although perhaps from a
position of initial detachment, many of us might not choose to
forfeit this awesome responsibility, just the same we might
not object too strenuously if, once lodged in industrial
society, we found ourselves stripped of it.
During the busy harvest season, the Amish farmer I
worked for suffered frequent tension headaches. His wife had
an ulcer which would flare up. My farmer gave me a pointer
should I ever decide to farm myself. "Don't try to do
everything," he said. "Just pick one thing a day to
accomplish and do it. One thing." His recurring downfall
was to get up in the morning, vacillate over which of many
sundry, somewhat interrelated tasks to perform given the
weather conditions, and then not do any of them. The
managerial complexities were such that, if efficiency was his
aim, it was actually most efficient simply to choose
arbitrarily and put the complexity out of his mind. I
myself--as his farm hand with my own temperament and talents
to dispose of as he liked (I was really a surrogate son)--was
one of the complexities that (alas) stymied him most.
Responsibility was like a cloud that hung over his wide-
brimmed straw hat. True, he wouldn't have exchanged this
responsibility for the world, for it obviously gave much of
the meaning to his life, but. . . one mistake at a critical
moment in the harvest--a misjudgment about the weather, soil
conditions, prices, or a technical error--could cost half the
year's income. He rarely made such mistakes. But tension
took its payment.
Reconciling choices in community. My farmer could
console himself that, in case of such a fiasco, he had his
neighbors to fall back on, just as he would cushion their
mishaps if the same happened to them. And this is not to
mention the general support of ongoing mutual assistance and
fellowship. But life in community brings its own challenges.
Again these are obstacles sprung from choice itself.
Compounding the difficulties of individual choice is the
presence of other members of a voluntary association all
making their choices. How is any unity or steadiness to come
of this? Amish Christianity--clearly dogmatic in its
application and long a barrier to secular humanists seeking
enlightened use of technology--nonetheless has been a strong
factor in providing the sort of moral atmosphere and precepts
necessary to preserve the holistic community. Perhaps most
critically, the Amish reverently heed Christ's example of
self-sacrifice for the good of others and believe that, at
times, they must cheerfully take up their own cross. The
value of personal sacrifice does not make the Amish dour;
quite the contrary. It is always expected that the joys of
rebirth and renewal come on the heels of self-abnegation.
Without a doubt, such forbearance, though not always
sufficient, has helped many Amish communities navigate
through many harrowing passageways. Still, communities
sometimes do fall apart from disagreements.
It has helped avert to such calamities that the Amish
balance the call to self-denial with practical measures that
greatly reduce the extent to which sacrifice is necessary.
The most important provision is one that postpones membership
into community until the prospective is mature and sure enough
to be able to be able to make a lifelong commitment. The
period of discernment, in effect, screens out incompatibles.
To set the scene for an exposition of this provision, however,
first consider the content of a typical Amish sermon with its
call to daily self-denial.
The Sermon. Picture yourself seated, as I was, on a
long wooden bench next to several other Amish men and boys
dressed in their best Sunday suspenders. We crane our heads,
now, with the rest of the well-attired community assembled in
the one-room school house (women sit opposite us), to hear the
inspirational words of the week--telling us how we might
better get along with our fellows in Christian love and
understanding. As the message begins, one's eyes pass over a
sea of pale white foreheads and burnished cheekbones--
two-toned markings of those who momentarily have removed their
straw hats after a week of hard work side by side in the hot
sun.
Today's Gospel reading is Luke 14:1-24. The deacon
begins:
There was a man who gave a great banquet, and
he invited a large number of people. When the time
for the banquet came, he sent his servant to say to
those who had been invited, "Come along: everything
is ready now." But all alike started to make
excuses. The first said, "I have bought a piece
of land and must go and see it. Please accept my
apologies." Another said, "I have bought five yoke
of oxen and am on my way to try them out. Please
accept my apologies." Yet another said, "I have
just got married and so am unable to come."
When the master found out he fell into a rage.
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"Bring in here the poor, the crippled, and blind
and the lame. . . . I tell you, not one of those
who were invited shall have a taste of my banquet."
When the Gospel is over, there is some settling as we
wait for today's major preacher, Levi, to begin.
He expresses the hope that we have come with the "right
preparation. I know many of you have." (That word "many" is
pointed.) If "thankfulness" for God's many gifts imbues us,
he exhorts, "You will be filled. Filled with the word of
God, the bread of life."
Next comes an analogy.
If a person is hungry "in a natural sense," he doesn't
need "sugar coating on his bread. The bread alone will
satisfy him." But "most of us" have never gone hungry for
natural food. So we often want to dress it up and "fancify"
it.
Just so with the spiritual life. If we have prepared
room in our hearts, creating a hunger there, we will savor
the taste of the Gospel. Like natural food eaten when
properly famished, it will fill us with thankfulness. If we
don't stimulate our spiritual stomachs, time will extinguish
taste, and we will pursue vain entertainments.
Not that there are not other obstacles. Whence comes
the strength to endure "trials, tribulations, and
temptations?" From a "willingness" to suffer through. Just
as we prepare a "hunger" for food, so do we acquire a taste
for these encumbrances, and we discover, as Christ predicts
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for us, "My cross is easy and my burden light." If we shrink
from difficulty, however, "We follow two masters, we place a
severe burden on ourselves. We are of two leanings."
Christ leads us only one direction: "the straight and
narrow path. . . . Some may try to take a detour and still
hope to reach the same outcome." They lack the necessary
"willingness."
Levi then draws on the Gospel reading, which teaches
that "the low shall be exalted and the proud laid low." Is
our humility only skin deep? Or does it come from the
"heart"? "If we are haughty at heart, then even if we try to
hide it, it will show itself in various ways."
The man with merely natural appetites--the "natural
man"--invites only his friends over for dinner because he
knows they will invite him back. He excludes the "blind,
lame, sick, elderly." The man with natural appetites also
spurns friendly invitations. To be sure, like the man
described in the scripture "we have to buy land because we
stress the wholesomeness of farming," but we can never
therefore "jam our schedule so full" of pressing engagements
that we never make visits but only excuses.
"There is (out in the wider world) a stress on
independence: I take care of myself, you take care of
yourself." But this is the way of the "natural man"--not of
Christ. Christian love and brotherly aid can be a cross to
bear, but if we bring to our duties the necessary
"willingness," the burden will be light and we can even come
to be thankful for it.
The limits of self-sacrifice: measures reducing or
mitigating conflicting interests and sham consensus. But
exhortations to endure hardship for others can only take one
so far. What if the strains become too great? This threshold
may well be reached, not only in ordinary interchanges, but
perhaps more significantly, in the process of forging
important community decisions. As we have seen, communities
sometimes split apart from disagreements. There thus must be
some way of reducing the occasions of such conflict.
But this raises an additional question. There is cause
now to doubt Amish tranquillity or "self-sacrifice" even when
communities seem on the surface to agree--as they usually do.
For if strong disagreements necessarily lead to oustings or
divisions, who would ever disagree? The cost would seem too
high. Community consensus--even if achieved in the name of
"self-sacrifice"--would thus seem a sham: agree with the
majority or else. People are looking out for their own necks,
not the good of others. The message of the minister becomes
superfluous. Potential dissenters would swallow their
objections whether implored to "sacrifice" or not.
For to leave the fold, even voluntarily, would mean the
loss not merely of rapport, but of a life-long investment. To
have been a member of an Amish community is to have interwoven
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one's whole being, thread by thread, in with a multi-faceted
social whole, connecting one geographically, financially,
emotionally, sociologically, intellectually, spiritually. To
sever these bonds would be a minor form of suicide. Is such
recourse even thinkable? Superficial serenity thus masks
fear, and "self-sacrifice," furtive self-interest. Or so
would it seem.
Real-life Amish experience arguably bears out such
apprehensions to a certain extent. Yet at the same time,
there is cause for qualified optimism. True, such pseudo-
agreement readily can and does occur not only in Amish, but
also non-Amish, organizations with "face-to-face" governing
procedures, and indeed have led to a "conformity" problem that
John Hostetler and Jane Mansbridge have discussed (vis a vis
the Amish and small democracies in general, respectively). 4 5
But a couple of Amish provisions (validated implicitly by
Mansbridge) reduce both the extent to which shams occur and
the costs borne when they occur. And such provisions, if
carried to their logical extensions, could avert most of this
mishap. Although the Amish place certain obstacles in front
of this realization, their ways suggest an ideal well within
grasp.
Bear in mind, as well, that every Amish settlement has
its own rules and procedures, its own personalities and
45Hostetler, op. cit., pp. 360-61; and Mansbridge, Beyond
Adversary Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
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"personality," and some may be more accommodating than others.
In fact, although the communities I visited were relatively
free from furtive conformity (in Lancaster County, Kentucky,
and Belize), from the literature it appears they can be more
or less so.
The provisions that mitigate covert conflict are these:
chiefly, delay of right of membership until certainty of
compatibility; and secondarily, in case of subsequent
departure, limitation of sanctions to certain, and not all,
aspects of community contact.
Delay of membership. The Amish, as Anabaptists, split
from the rest of Christendom 450 years ago (I am here lumping
them with their Mennonite progenitors) precisely on the issue
of informed choice. They regarded the reigning Christian
practice (still prevalent today) of baptizing a newborn into
a faith it couldn't understand as a mockery which, as if not
deplorable enough in itself, led directly to the widespread
mediocrity of belief and practice permeating existing
Christian churches--precisely a problem of furtive conformity
like that we are trying to avoid. What sort of Christian, the
Amish founders asked, can someone be with no knowledge or
experience of the religion he is being initiated into? Amish
society thus confined membership to adults--that is (in other
words) free and rational beings exercising a conscious and
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informed choice.46 Today, sociologist Marc Olshan goes so far
as to describe the existence of Amish society in the midst of
a (seemingly) antagonistic modernity as testifying to the
epitome of choice. The Amish, paradoxically, he says,
epitomize modernity.4 Their very anachronism can only mean
they are a self-made or "artificial" people--a consciously
willed people. On this view, the Amish have inherited not a
timorously conformist, but an openly rebellious character.
The archetypal Amish person, indeed, was willing to make
himself a public martyr for his renegade beliefs.
True to their iconoclastic colors in part, the Amish
today to varying degrees permit youth the opportunity to
explore the world around them before committing themselves to
community and Christianity. This makes becoming Amish
entirely voluntary, and membership self-selected. One could
indeed almost say, the Amish are "self-made" men and women.
The pre-commitment period has acquired the nickname of
rumspringa ("running around") in Lancaster County. Amish
youth buy cars, go to movies, travel, and sometimes begin
attending other churches. A few tour the country looking for
an Amish community just right for them. (One limitation they
suffer at this time of choice is the lack of a broad
46See Hostetler, op. cit., Ch. 2 for a brief history of the
origins of Anabaptism and Amish society.
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Alternative Interpretation," Rural Sociology, 38(2), 123-35,
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education--a deficiency that will be explored below. Another
problem is, at times, overweening parental expectations, but
this, I think, is a condition found in non-Amish societies
too.) Approximately one third of youth on their rumspringa
elect to leave the Amish for good. The rest remain.
It is easy to see reason why their level of commitment,
after viewing and weighing alternatives, should be more secure
than if they had lacked such an opportunity. And this is, in
part, what originators of adult baptism hoped to achieve in
delaying initiation rites. Matured members have had the
chance to discern whether they really belong with the Amish--
whether they will get along with the personalities and truly
agree with the practices and precepts of community.
What does all this have to do with true concord in
governing decisions? If Amish persons are in considerable
agreement with the rest before entering community, then in
subsequent decision-making, chances are high that agreement
will be more than skin-deep. An underlying "unity of
interests," in fact, is precisely the secret for success,
according to Mansbridge, for any face-to-face community trying
to hammer out consensus without duress. Such a "unity of
interests" is heightened when Amish individuals have an
extended opportunity to select the community right for them.
If, on the other hand, interests don't really converge in a
deep way--if, for example, Amish youth choose too hastily (or
their parents strong-arm them as sometimes happens)--then
subsequent agreements will probably be superficial.
Mansbridge points to three principal areas of convergent
interests (the last two, especially, are encouraged in a
small-scale Christian community):
1. When personal interests converge.
2. When one adopts another's interests as one's own.
3. When one adopts the interest of the community as a
whole as one's own. 48
All three areas are operative among the Amish since,
under "ideal" circumstances, they are given the chance,
1. To choose a community good for them in the narrow
sense (where they can make a living).
2. To choose a community whose personalities, or at
least "personality," they get along with.
3. To choose a community whose precepts and principles
they believe are true.
Thus, even if agreement wanes in one respect, it can be
made up for in others. One Amish farmer I knew in Kentucky
confided to me that he really didn't think the community's
rule banning all motors was necessary. He certainly would
have bought a motor or two for himself if he could have to
pump his water or bale his hay. But his larger identification
with the interests and aims of the community as a whole, and
with the interests of various particular members who were his
friends, more than compensated for his sacrifice, and he
48Op. cit., p.27.
didn't have any trouble "going along" with the rule. Nor was
this mere calculated self-interest, narrowly construed, on his
part since he actively adopted the good of others as his own
good. What made them happy helped make him happy.
One obstacle, however, that most Amish communities retain
which prevents full realization of these benefits, is the
religious stigma which is often attached to non-assent to a
community dictum. Non-compliance--whether by members or non-
members--is officially branded "worldly," or worse, heretical,
and in either case, if left unrepented, proclaimed grounds for
perdition. This is not merely because it flouts the
community's will (and salvation is thought possible only
through life in a Christian community4 9 ), but because the
violated rule may itself be (officially) considered "true" in
some absolute sense. That rule, combined with many or all the
other rules, is precisely the true mark that gives an Amish
community special claim as the gateway to heaven. Wearing
shorts in public, for instance, may be regarded a damnable sin
for any human being anywhere.
This stigma creates a number of problems. First, it
dampens freedom of discussion, especially among those with a
minority viewpoint. This, in turn, limits choice in the
selection of rules. Second--and no less importantly--it
forces the Amish to make membership in the community, should
See Hostetler, op. cit., Ch. 4, for a fuller exposition
of such Amish beliefs. Also, review Ch. 2 for their origins.
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it come about, lifelong. Officially there is only one true
"church," one gateway to heaven, and after entering, only one
consequence of turning back. Less absolute claims--say, that
an Amish church is only one possible way among Christian
approaches--would make possible shorter-term renewable
memberships and periodic leaves of absence. This, in turn,
would give members the option of gracefully bowing out if they
found they no longer agreed with community sentiment.
Decision-making, in the meantime, would be all the freer.
Thus the Amish, I believe, would do better to make a
clearer distinction between essential (Protestant) Christian,
and purely derivative, articles of their community codes.
Unofficially, I think they do this already, as testified by
occasional transgressions I saw being "winked" at and the
ready use Amish made of loopholes in the rules (in Lancaster,
one officially could not have a telephone in the house, so one
built a phone booth in the barnyard instead). The "essential"
elements would include those which are universal requirements
for all (Protestant) Christians (admittedly a matter of great
dispute in itself). "Derivative" elements would encompass
those rules which merely help a particular community in a
particular time fulfill its Christian ideals (thus, for
example, the wearing of monastic garb is not mandatory for all
Catholics, but only one way of expressing the Catholic faith
for a selected group). If the Amish have trouble presently
(officially) making such a distinction, I suspect the problem
is related to their narrowly parochial education, which will
be discussed below.
Still, all told, the intimacy of the Amish union, coupled
with and reinforced by the free choice one has in membership,
yield an extraordinarily high degree of genuine unity on
potentially divisive issues--far higher, in fact, than the
most unified face-to-face democracy Mansbridge studied. This
unity minimizes the need for most "adversary democracy"
procedures she describes, such as the secret ballot, which
presuppose the existence of fundamental differences in
interest. The closest the Amish come to an "adversary"
procedure is the ancient Biblical practice of selecting
ministers by lot--a measure that avoids "majority rule" in
voting for a "popular" leader--always a highly subjective and
potentially divisive decision because it involves differences
in personality.
For those who cannot or will not attain such a unity as
the Amish enjoy, more such procedures would be called for.
These protect and weigh the interests of the minority against
those of the majority and prevent a sham consensus. 50 The cost
of decreased unity, however, whatever its advantages, would
seem to be loss of some of the attractions that would lead
people to form small-scale communities in the first place.
500p. cit., pp.15-17, pp.273-77, and pp.281-92.
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Limited sanctions. Say, however, our farmer above
decided the rule impinged on him too severely to be endured.
In Amish environs this is highly unlikely if he had tested out
the community thoroughly before joining, so let us say he
goofed, made an impulsive decision, and found himself in
adversarial waters. Alternatively, let us say circumstances
in the wider world have drastically changed and posed the
community prickly new dilemmas that no one could have possibly
foreseen on joining--in which case the whole character and
meaning of being a member may have changed. Now, if he quits
or is ousted, he may face the stigma of an officially declared
"perdition," but no Athenian exile. Chances are, if he
disagreed so strongly, he was not alone, and others will
accompany him in the formation of a new group of like-minded
persons. In fact, all new Amish fellowships are formed this
way, and there are dozens of different ones in nineteen
different states. He and his followers may even discover an
existing community waiting to welcome him with open arms,
saving him the trouble of starting from scratch. (A solitary
renegade without compatriots is rare because highly
distinctive individuals tend not to join Amish communities in
the first place).
Given this, the exiled party will resume life--a little
beleaguered perhaps--as part of a new social whole whose
complex ties grow to replace the conduits of nourishment of
the abandoned unity. In this position, he can readily endure
the sanctions imposed on him (light by comparison with those
inflicted on Socrates):
1. No more attendance at the old church.
2. No eating at the same table with previous associates
(separate tables in the same room are allowed).
3. No substantial economic interactions with previous
associates. (Enforcement and interpretation of this rule
appears somewhat discretionary at least in Lancaster County.
The farmer I worked for in Pennsylvania almost daily assisted
at his brother's farm even though the brother had left the Old
Order Amish and become part of a "New Order" Amish group that
allowed electricity and in-house telephones.)
4. No riding in vehicles with previous Amish associates.
Not that I am advocating (or detracting from) these
sanctions, but from all this merely concluding: even in the
case of insuperable disagreements, the Amish "ejectee" has a
life, and not a bad one at that. He resides in the same
place. He has lost some close associations, but probably made
new ones. He avoids the barrenness of pure exile. He has not
committed a form of suicide. Incidentally, since this outcome
is thinkable, it eases the pressures on possible dissenters in
community discussions, reducing the likelihood of sham.
Still, the disadvantages of such a dislocation cannot be
ignored (whether such penalties or other kinds of costs are
incurred). The problem is best avoided by the person's
making sure of close compatibility before joining an Amish
community (or ideally, in offering different, optional levels
of commitment). of course, drastically changing circumstances
can never be controlled for.
Section IV
Technological Society Deepens Amish choice. Does all this
mean that from the point of view of "deep" choice, modern
industrial culture is intrinsically worthless--at best a
holding pen for people who are not rugged enough to make it
all the way to agrarianism? No; even from such a possibly
"deep" point of view, the existence of our industrial society
has important values. While it may go far in excess of what
it needs to, a technological society enhances both material
and moral aspects of the spartan agrarian's choice.
Material. Quite simply, whole-life seekers can
benefit from (though they may not absolutely need) advances
of modern science and industry. I have already pointed out
use of the telephone. While the Amish are highly ambivalent
about that and accepted it only as an accommodation, they
have no reservations about innumerable other byproducts of
modern science and industry (which they could still do
without if they wished): hand-held flashlights; machine-made
cloth and thread; mass-produced hand and horse-drawn
implements; and for some Amish groups even (non-vehicular)
motorized machinery, such as pumps, hay-balers, corn-pickers,
and gas-powered refrigeration devices. The Amish, it would
appear, enjoy a first-world standard of living. They at
least would be considered well-off in relation to the large
majority of the world's population.
Moral and educational. The existence, side by side, of
two such starkly different possible worlds, "technological"
and Amish, enhances choice. This is true not only in terms of
sheer volume (what again might be called "breadth of choice"),
but also in quality (heightening "depth of choice"). When
there is a definite possibility of going either direction, any
choice made becomes more meaningful than it would otherwise
be. All told, an Amish person has a more robust decision in
front of him today than 100 years ago when there was both less
variety of outside opportunity and less of a difference
between Amish and non-Amish ways. This consideration,
indeed, helped Olshan conclude the Amish "epitomize" modern
choice. (Again, the Amish, as Anabaptists, that is, adult
baptizers, are not "born" Amish. They make the decision to
enter the community upon reaching what is considered the age
of consent, roughly eighteen or older.)
Here lurks one area where, in fact, the Amish may serve
as a negative example, and the presence of modernity (namely,
in some of the educational opportunities it offers) a
potential blessing. I suspect the Amish do not provide their
youth sufficient education to make a circumspect choice. To
be sure, frowning on "book learning" and forbidding
post-eighth-grade education serve an invaluable purpose when
the most important skills and knowledge for the life one leads
are acquired through natural, real-life contacts and
interactions while growing up on a family farm. Amish youth
can barely stand the long wait, as it is, before that day of
liberation when they will have been set free from the
schoolhouse to be initiated into the world of adult
responsibilities. I became the object of pity and wonderment
when it was found out that at the age of twenty-eight, I was
still in school.
Nevertheless, the Amish severely limit the available
grounds on which a choice can be made--this, especially
considering that school is limited in the name of not only
practicality but also some questionable interpretations of
Biblical scriptures. And what good is "informed choice" (that
which only an adult can make, in contrast to an infant, before
Baptism), when there is not enough "information"?
On arriving in an Amish community in Belize, Central
America, I remarked, gazing at the steep cone-like hills that
encircled the village, "My, these hills must be of volcanic
origin."
The retort of the Amish youth who stood near me was:
"Those hills were here when God first made the earth."
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I then pointed out to him the fact that a 10,000 foot
volcano now exists in Mexico in a place that was flat as a
pancake last century.
"Well, these hills were here when God created the
earth."
The youth, age fifteen, was sturdy, responsible,
outgoing, and (in other respects) knowledgeable. He was
doing quite well considering that formal Amish schooling in
Belize, by recent community fiat, extends only to the fourth
grade.
The Amish farmer I worked for in Pennsylvania once
pointed to the white trail left by an airplane high in the
blue sky. "The jet stream," he exclaimed.
Most Amish are trained from childhood (to degrees varying
from community to community) that to leave the fold is to be
imperiled with perdition. The outside world is the playground
of the unchurched and the fallen Christians, who are presided
over, in turn, by the devil. Even many other Amish
communities are suspect and fail to attain an acceptable level
of holiness or doctrinal orthodoxy. Side by side two Amish
communities may sit virtually indistinguishable to the
outsider (such as in Kitchener, Ontario) and consider each
other "lost." The issue that divides them and that becomes
the litmus test of "truth" (as is the case now in Kitchener)
may be as minor as whether the proper color of a buggy should
be black or natural wood. (Admittedly, clashing personalities
and long-mounting ideological conflict help trigger such
feuds, so they may represent the tip of a deeper iceberg ).
The question remains, do many of the Amish know enough to
be able to make a meaningful choice? Most Amish, if given the
choice, I suspect, would prefer not to know more than they do,
thus not to have to make a real choice. (For true choice, as
we have seen, is difficult). But some would. The
intellectually gifted among the Amish feel the worst of this
reduction. Either they endure extreme frustration in
attempting to rise to the peak of their powers and be able to
make such a choice, or they leave the community for good when
reaching maturity and never really have the chance to choose
on satisfactory grounds. Either eventuality is wrenching.52
Amish parochialism thus highlights the value of
meaningful choice, in particular by showing the saving
possibilities of broader offerings outside--including
educational ones. (Is narrowness, by the way, then necessary
to perpetuate an Amish-like way of life? While it may have
helped the Amish hold tight to their youth, I think a better
education could also induce them to remain, and do so more
justly. Good education, however, is not easily gotten under
any circumstances.)




. . . and the Amish are good for industrialism. Grounds for
not only removing barriers, but actively promoting Amish ways.
There is an important question left dangling. Is there
anyone out there besides the Amish who would lead their
demanding way of life? And how could we ever know for sure
whether, if the persons really tried, they could establish
such a life without any modifications in the basic structure
of society favoring them? Maybe the reason no one is doing
it is simply lack of interest and dedication.
In other words, the constituency for the opportunity I
am marking out is in question. It may not only lie outside
the mainstream, it may be a figment. And what basis for
government subsidy or preferential legal treatment is that?
The task then would seem to be to show that such rugged
communitarians exist, yet are thwarted by the absence of some
public program that would ease their prospects in a
competitive market economy.
One way, however, to obviate the need for such a
demonstration would be to show that, whether or not they
exist, it would be nice if they existed--nice for everybody,
including those who would not want to lead such a life
themselves. The task, in other words, would be to demonstrate
that a group like the Amish can count as a bona fide "public
good" (definition supplied below). Then, even if no one
presently wants to lead such a life, we still would have
grounds for encouraging somebody to do so. If no one takes
to it anyhow, we will have at least tried our best. This, of
course, is an entirely different sort of argument from the one
relying on fairness which I was making earlier (suggesting we
should redress inequalities to those wronged by
compartmentalization), yet it would nicely resolve this
practical query arising from that investigation. It would
kill two birds with one stone: now not only would
opportunities open up for the potentially disadvantaged
parties, these opportunities would be specially promoted and
socially affirmed. And we wouldn't have to try to figure out
whether the disadvantaged parties actually were willing to
turn to the "whole life."
The Amish as a "Public Good." In simple words, the Amish
are good for us. The "whole life"/"industrial life"
complementarity goes both ways. The Amish (or a similarly
'whole" group) can indeed be regarded as a "public good" in an
industrial society and should be supported on the same grounds
as are parks, roads, national defense, and public education.
What the Amish share with these public programs is this:
while they provide benefits to everyone, at the same time in
a pure market system they would be undersupported. Individ-
uals would not find it rational to contribute when their
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contributions would have a negligible effect on the procurance
or size of the benefit they would receive. But if no one
contributed, no benefit would come at all. Hence, individuals
would find it preferable jointly to be required to contribute.
Such a public good must meet the following five criteria:
1. Widespread, but not universal, contribution is both
necessary and sufficient for large quantities of the
good to be produced.
2. If the good is produced, it is available even to
non-contributors.
3. Contribution is a non-negligible cost.
4. The effect of individual contributions on the amount
of the good available to them is negligible.
5. The amount of the good that each individual would
gain from widespread contribut on outweighs the costs
of his share of contribution.
Although most people probably would prefer not
to return to the land and the "simple life" because it would
be (seemingly) too hard a lifestyle to endure and because
they are already committed and accustomed to their industrial
roles, nevertheless they benefit from the fact that somebody
out there is leading such a life. In short, the "simple life"
produces spinoffs, and unless I am mistaken, these spinoffs
meet the "public goods" criteria:
1. Someone is preserving our heritage, our collective
memory of our roots (the Amish in fact settled here before the
American revolution).
53Slightly modified excerpt from David 0. Brink,
"Cooperative activity and public goods" (unpublished).
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2. Like grandmothers and home-made apple pie, although
you might not want to be or to make one yourself, you are
glad to be able to return to them for periodic renewal and
refreshment.
3. Such ways of life seem, in some general way that is
difficult to articulate, to add to rather than subtract from
the overall health and vigor of society, especially seen over
the long run.
In fact, such an inkling is bolstered by specific
features of the Amish:
a) They hold the land in trust: their methods conserve
and enrich the soil, rather than wash it away and destroy it
as most modern practices do.
b) They use far fewer other non-replenishable resources
than the rest of us.
c) They thus help to keep prices for such things lower.
d) Amish methods are minimally polluting.
e) The Amish can readily and do function as a "social
relief agency" for unwanted or shiftless youth who, under the
auspices of the Fresh Air Fund of Brooklyn, can spend their
summers away from the arid cityscapes.
f) The Amish can and do easily care for their own in
times of distress or infirmity. Also, mental illness, crime,
indigence, family break-down, drugs and alcohol abuse,
unwanted pregnancy, and other signs of social disintegration
are low among the Amish. All this lightens the burden of
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social agencies that must alleviate such ills for everyone
else.
g) An Amish-like culture serves as "civilization
insurance." In case of an economic or other catastrophe, a
widely dispersed, self-sufficient agrarian population would
buffer us from total oblivion.
It would seem if more people--though maybe not you or
I--emulated the ways of the Amish, this country would be a
better place for all of us.
Thus, such a Spartan agrarianism, though not presently
popular, qualifies as a public good, a value that we might not
want to fulfill individually on our own but nevertheless
merits generalized approval and preferential governmental
treatment (hence, if appropriate, say some obligatory tax
concession from all of us) in the hopes that it may become
more popular. Interestingly, such treatment would fall in a
long line of precedents: sundry European and New World
governments seeking to develop previously unusable land and to
raise overall economic prosperity have at various times (even
as recently as the 1970s in Belize) invited the Amish into
their domains and granted them a special haven.
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Section VI
Proposals. I am not using these arguments as a basis
for rejecting Rawls's Theory in particular or liberal
egalitarianism in general. In fact, if certain adjustments
are made, instead of the "lesser of evils," they can give us
"the best of both worlds." They could insure both breadth
and depth of personal opportunity and in the process, avoid
necessarily aggravating certain persons' susceptibilities in
grave areas while maintaining an acceptable material standard
of living and enhancing the general public good.
But it is in the area of practical implementation that an
advocate of the "whole life" faces perhaps the most serious
difficulties. A patch of Amish people still appears highly
incongruous in a technological age. Scoffers will laugh at
the thought of modelling a public reform on them, much less
diverting taxpayers' support toward new Amish oases.
Turning back the clock?
Trying to stop Progress?
Yearning for a naively simpler time?
Such queries one will read in the quizzical looks of
hearers of "whole life" proposals. The underlying thought
seems to be this. The "whole life" just doesn't fit in with
the modern world. And for this reason, trying to put it in
effect is highly impractical. This brings us back to Rawls,
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who speaks of "limited social space" in any culture,
precluding the possibility of pursuing every way of life.
Yet in the final analysis, the prime obstacle to
supporting Amish-like ways is this skepticism itself. For as
I have just attempted to show, in selected significant
respects, the relationship between Amish life and
technological society is far from antagonistic. The two can
be seen even to need each other. A more detailed look at
various practical measures--some of which I will propose below
and some of which are already in effect--underscores the
potential for this symbiosis. About all that remains is for
some rebellious souls, like the Amish progenitors, willing to
take up the challenge of a ground-breaking choice--and perhaps
endure a few quizzical stares.
A sample intermediate plan. Before moving to the more
radical proposals, consider a possible sort of intermediate
plan. I argued in the sections on social ills that it would
not do (for both practical and ethical reasons) simply to
expand the list of primary goods even if they are interpreted
to be as substantive as Sen's functionings. That could well
be too little too late. Especially for those worst affected,
it would address they symptoms and not the underlying cause.
But some further material has been introduced. Contributing
to the problem may be not merely susceptibility to malaise
but also the lack of a certain adeptness (which may or may not
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always dispose one to "downfall"). Conceivably, such
adeptness may be readily taught, unlike the ability to avoid,
say, psychological collapse. Hence, for the benefit of that
portion of the population for whom it would apply, it might
be instilled as a preventative; yet it wouldn't matter if
those susceptible were unidentifiable because instruction
could be universal. Thus, without touching the basic
structure of society or conceptions of the good, we might
preempt a certain amount of suffering (I suspect this might
not be the greater portion) through conventional, practical
channels. "Home economics" courses have long been offered in
secondary schools; why not "life-plan integration" courses?
Such an approach might take many people some distance.
But this is hardly enough. For many people it would not
do, whether the tendency is to depression, to lack of
adeptness, or to some other disadvantaging tendency (even
normality). For them, modifications in the basic structure
are called for. (These would have to accompanied by an
ongoing general publicity campaign as already hinted). And
besides, as indicated above, the general public good provides
additional grounds for more substantial efforts.
A new homestead act. For those who may need or want it,
and for a more generally robust society, an alternative to
highly specialized and scattered compartmentalization should
be offered to complement it. This would take the form of a
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low-specialization preserve, a kind of protected bastion for
small-scale diversity. Call the measure a post-modern
homestead act. The phrasing would point to its return in
spirit to the ideal underlying its precedent in America: the
opportunity to make a fresh start on an equal footing with
others, no matter one's background. Those freely entering
would have to agree to abide by certain rules that would
prevent encroachments of economics and technology, or other
possible intrusions of large-scale, compartmentalized
systems. Arrangements could perhaps be modelled after
existing systems that have passed the test of real life, such
as those of the Amish.
Financial and administrative reinforcements. The
U. S. government is presently paying farmers billions of
dollars as a way of inducing them not to produce (thanks to
highly specialized modern farming techniques that have led to
unmanageable grain and produce surpluses). Meanwhile, to
encourage settlement of vast tracts of unused lands, two
separate communities in the state of Minnesota have
inaugurated their own homestead programs. While it was in
effect, the Koochiching County measure offered up to forty
acres of land for any person who would reside on the premises
for at least ten years and had proven resources for self-
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sufficiency.54 (Note: these forsaken lands are not the same
ones the government is subsidizing). Some decades back, other
rural re-orientation programs, administered federally during
the New Deal, yielded (at low cost) dramatic long-term
successes--financial and psychological--only recently made
known.55 These developments suggest that my proposals do not
lie out of the realm of possibility. In fact, they could be
implemented immediately. I would suggest certain additional
concrete measures as supplements or alternatives to land
giveaways.
1. Financial. Direct subsidy on account of neediness
can create dependency and lower esteem or morale of its
recipients (hardly desirable if the goal in part is to lower
chances of depression). By contrast, tax exemptions for good
reasons can have opposite effects--they can invigorate and
reinforce a sense of self-directed purpose. The Amish are
already exempt from Social Security Tax on the grounds that
their religion requires them to provide for the aged of their
community. It seems likely that this exemption explains much
about both their unrelenting spirit of independence and their
financial solvency at a time of disaster for other family
farmers. (Social Security self-employment tax is quite
steep). The Amish in particular--since their gross income is




rather small--appear vulnerable to cash levies. To a
significant degree, their business is aimed not at earning a
high profit on the market, but internal consumption, and this
decreases cash-flow. For example, a young Amish farmer I
know working forty acres in Kentucky netted approximately
$4000 in 1988, and for the size of his family, this income
was not atypical. It left little margin to satisfy creditors
and tax collectors.
Could modern-day homesteaders qualify for Social
Security exemptions? Since this exemption depends on the
supposition of a future provision--which they have no
certainty of--in this sense, no. But in another sense,
perhaps: using their existing provisions--the food they
presumably would be growing--could they not earn exemptions
by supplying the aged in their immediate vicinity with vital
goods? Or provide goods and services to any identifiably
needy persons around them, such as unwanted children, the
handicapped, or sick? As it happens, the Amish might already
qualify on this score. In the Lancaster area many of them
participate in "The Fresh Air Fund"--a Brooklyn-based program
that seeks temporary summer homes in refreshing rural
environments for underprivileged children from New York City.
Some of these children have found permanent abodes with the
Amish, exchanging their inner-city slang for Pennsylvania
Dutch as a first language. Such ministration as this, as I
have already indicated, helps qualify the Amish as a "public
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good."
Property and school tax. Besides Social Security Tax,
which exacts an inflexible percentage of one's income, even
more threatening may be property and school taxes (the
Minnesota lands were deserted mainly because of the failure
of their former owners to be able to pay these) which can be
even more rigid. All could be adjusted, eliminated, or
rebated in credits for those meeting the conditions of "home-
steaders"--and not on the grounds, again, that they are needy
but on contrary ones: that they are pursuing a many-faceted
way of life and therefore are less dependent on the
governmental agencies and subsidies that fill in the gaps for
most other people and, moreover, spread benefits for the
people that surround them. The envisioned homesteaders would
require less extensive school systems because they would be
teaching their children much of what they need to know on the
job. Road maintenance would be less urgent because of the
geographical unity of small-scale society (current Amish
buggy wheels, which have metal rims, however, tend to tear up
blacktop pavement so the Amish might do well to make an
adjustment here). And again, regarding Social Security and
other such assistance programs, it would be easier for the
aged, infirm, and unwanted to find care in an integrated
social environment with a variety of personally tended niches
than amid social fragmentation. Or at least, so would I
expect based on my observations of the Amish.
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Exemption from income tax? Incidentally, such charity
may be implementing, in effect, Rawls's Difference Principle
on a small scale (and of course, voluntarily instead of
compulsorily). In a close-knit community such as that of the
Amish, especially when regulated by norms of Christian
goodwill, it would seem highly incongruous to act counter to
the Difference Principle, which, again, states that
inequalities shall be to the greatest benefit of the least
well-off. For an Amish person to grow wealthier or benefit
in other substantial respects (acquiring other of Rawls's
"primary goods") while leaving those around him grasping in
the dust would be most unseemly. Behavior in accord with an
approximation of the Difference Principle (of course, it would
be capped by an income limitation in keeping with the Amish
disapproval of luxury) is a matter of course for the Amish.
Thus the addition of a governmentally mandated tax for the
sake of wealth-redistribution would be a redundancy. Amish
behavior again obviates the need for imposing such exactions
in the first place.
The "whole life" as a unique public good. Moreover,
it would appear that the kind of care, attention, and
monetary assistance the Amish lavish both on each other and
on outsiders whom they may have occasion to aid (say adopted
children or temporary refugees from urban areas) is often
much more effective than any which a governmental agency
could manage. This would be true by virtue of the two major
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benefits of the whole life described: the rich convergence
of its dimensions and the greater personal control it
affords. Two young girls, both suffering mental handicaps,
were adopted by the Amish family I worked for in Kentucky.
No one else would probably have taken them in their
condition, and the life they were leading on the farm,
feeding chickens, petting puppies, prancing across pastures,
helping Mom with the canning, imitating Dad's carpentry
beside him on scrap boards in the wood shop, and yes, getting
spanked for disobedience and trying to get out of chores--all
under the watchful eye of the parents or other older
caretakers--was beyond compare to life in an orphanage.
What would be the fate of such disadvantaged youth into
adulthood if they lacked such nurturance? Continued
institutionalization? Homelessness? Some wayward marginal
existence? In Amish society, they were assured a secure niche
to old age. Interestingly, in this way it appears that
certain potential victims of adult depression may benefit from
the "whole life" even if they don't undertake homesteading
themselves. Conditions for positive mental and sociological
health may have "spillover" effects.
Again, it appears we have grounds not only for exempting
the Amish from burdens, but actively subsidizing, or at least
in some way supporting, the kinds of efforts they undertake.
If anything, we should be taxed to promote the Amish.
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2. Administrative. Following dubiously upon the
directives of original Homestead and Land Grant college acts
of the nineteenth century, agricultural colleges and bureaus
across the country now employ faculty or send out "agents"
everywhere advising farmers how better to fine-hone their
specialized skills and thereby earn more money in the
competitive market.56 The aggregate effect of this approach
is manifest: cultural devastation, abandonment, and death
(literally because of unbelievably high accident and suicide
rates) in farming communities; soil exhaustion, poisoning and
depletion of the water table, and emptied landscapes dotted
by collapsing barns and rusting equipment, and agricultural
bonanzas visible in lower prices for the consumer at the
grocery store--which however would be lower still if the
government weren't spending billions on the removal of
farmland from production. One irony here is that
agricultural supports are often justified by the claim that
farming is "a way of life," not merely a "business." Facing
just that tension--if I may rephrase it as one between less-
competitive integrated living and starkly competitive
specialization--has thus been not only my task throughout
56For a history of the drift and depredations in these
agricultural programs, see Jim Hightower, Hard Tomatoes, Hard
Times (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing
Company, 1973). Hightower maintains that the part of the
original charter mandating the improvement of rural life has
been ignored or subordinated, along with every other goal, to
the supreme value of "efficiency."
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this paper, but also that of partly unknowing agricultural
policy makers in real life. Is there a resolution for this
public dilemma?
Wouldn't it be both less costly all around and more
effective as policy simply to retrain a certain portion of
the agricultural faculty and agents? Couldn't some of them
be promoting not competition, but interdependence,
integration, and community solidarity, and by way not of
over-specialization, but diversity, small-scale stewardship,
mutual aid, and thrift (yet while not depriving recipients of
modern farming techniques where and if appropriate)? Every
year countless hopefuls apply for a handful of forest ranger
openings in our nation's park system. Would there be any
shortage of applicants to fill spots as the stewards of a new
Agricultural Parks system? Would there be any shortage of
successful Amish farmers to consult on how to build it? (See
book list at end for more practical guidelines).
Conclusion. I have argued that Rawls's Theory of
Justice, a work representative of modern liberal egalitarian
thought, fails to come to terms with a profound problem
endemic to modern technological society: the fragmentation of
life and the accompanying strictures on human freedom
affecting, in turn, various social ills. The very
inequalities which Rawls at first glance would seem to permit
on the grounds they would increase wealth and opportunity for
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everybody, also on closer examination, through
industrially-induced fragmentation would be associated with a
general drop in depth of choice for most, and a more
particularized drop in mental and sociological health for
many. (Thus would it appear in the last case, anyway, and
there is no risk in proceeding on this appearance, but a great
risk in not doing so). Thus, if licensed, these inequalities
would not leave everyone better off. Nor would they be fair.
Is there a way out? Are we stuck in a "limited social
space" with a limited livable scope? Or can we, alongside
the fragmentation, foster wholeness and unity and achieve the
best both avenues have to offer? Oddly enough, agricultural
policy makers have been asking similar questions. Their
mistake has been to try to give with one hand what they take
with the other. They want to preserve what they call "a way
of life, not a business." But they also, in effect, push on
farmers the very sharp-edged implements that undermine this
"way of life" and engorge our society with surplus edibles
(perhaps in the name of making us all "better off"). Cannot
they--and we--make up our minds? Do we all want to be
(perhaps fat) city mice? Or do we want at least to allow
room for some of us to be country mice?
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